What Is It For If It's Before Me?: Subjectification and Grammaticalization of English *For* and *Before**

Seongha Rhee

(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Seongha Rhee. 2007. What Is It For If It's Before Me?: Subjectification and Grammaticalization of English *For* and *Before*. *Studies in British and American Language and Literature* 84: 209-231. Subjectification has been among those concepts frequently resorted to in grammaticalization scholarship since the concept was first formulated by Traugott (1982) as a semantic change mechanism. English prepositions *for* and *before,* both derived from a common Germanic root **fora* 'front', are exemplars *par excellence* of exhibiting contrastive properties as a result of differential application of subjectification. In modern English, *for* is primarily used to designate advantageous/beneficial relationship between the figure and the background, whereas *before* is primarily specialized for the designation of spatial or, more productively, temporal anteriority. In the case of *for*, the semantic extension pattern can be represented as [frontal location > temporal anteriority > representation > cause/reason > support/benefit > purpose > destination > advantage/disadvantage]. Diverse semantic change mechanisms operate over this long progression of semantic change, often involving attribution of speaker's stance about the event, i.e. subjectification. Since the emergence of a new sense resulting from conventionalization of pragmatic

inferences does not necessarily render the previous senses obsolete, diverse meanings may occur at any synchronic state, thus accounting for the notorious polysemy phenomenon for grammatical forms such as *for*. As for *before*, it is largely used to show the 'earlier in time' relations or the 'in front of' relations between the two referenced entities. However, it also exhibits, albeit weakly as compared with *for,* a level of subjectified semantic change that may be diagrammatically represented as [frontal location > temporal anteriority > potentiality > superiority > preference]. (**Hankuk University of Foreign Studies**)

Key words: subjectification, grammaticalization, preposition *for,* preposition *before,* heterosemy, metonymy

1. Introduction

English prepositions *for* and *before* are excellent examples of grammaticalization in many aspects as their diachronic development exhibits properties typical of grammaticalization processes at morpho-syntactic, semantic and phonological levels. Furthermore, their individual developmental paths show certain differences as well as commonalities that bear significance in grammaticalization studies. This paper intends to provide an exposition on such developmental paths and illustrate how human construal of the states of affairs affects the language use and, consequently, effects linguistic changes.

This paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 discusses the notion of 'subjectification' with reference to semantic change, since this notion is critical in understanding the grammaticalization processes involving *for* and *before*; Section 3 illustrates the grammaticalization phenomena of these two prepositions tracing their origin to the lexical sources and describing how subjectification and metonymization contributed to extensive semantic change; Section 4 discusses the issues that arise in the preceding discussions such as the differential subjectification and specialization;

and Section 5 summarizes the major findings and presents a conclusion.

2. Preliminary: Subjectification

Subjectification has been among those concepts frequently resorted to in grammaticalization scholarship since the concept was first formulated by Traugott (1982) to account for the recurrent tendencies observed in semantic change. Subjectification is defined as a process whereby speaker involvement is reflected in semantic change.

Of the prime examples are *after* and *since,* as illustrated in the following:

(1) *after*
    a. Shut the door <u>after</u> you.
    b. Brush your teeth <u>after</u> breakfast.
    c. <u>After</u> we heard the lecture we felt greatly inspired.

(2) *since*
    a. I have done quite a bit of writing <u>since</u> we last met.
    b. <u>Since</u> Susan left him, John has been very miserable.
    c. <u>Since</u> you are not coming with me, I will have to go alone.
    d. <u>Since</u> you are so angry, there is no point in talking with you.
              (Traugott & König 1991: 194-195)

In (1a) *after* has the spatial meanings of 'spatial posteriority' involving physical space. This is the earliest usage attested in English. In (1b) *after* carries the temporal meaning of 'temporal posteriority', involving events in sequence in time. This usage is attested as early as in Old English (OE, henceforth). In (1c) *after* carries the causal meaning of 'because', involving events in causal chain. This usage as

a causal connective began in Middle English. What is obvious is that the meanings become gradually abstract and in the course of this abstraction process, the speaker's viewpoint (as can be captured by the logical fallacy *post hoc ergo propter hoc*) is projected into the lexical meaning of *after*.

Likewise, the examples in (2) show a similar pattern. In (2a), for instance, *since* merely designates a time point after which the assertion in the main clause stands, i.e. it has the temporal sense. In (2b), the semantics of *since* is ambiguous between the temporal meaning and the causal meaning, due to the erroneous, yet seemingly ever-present and powerful, reasoning of aforementioned *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. Examples (2c) and (2d), since they refer to a non-past event or to a state, have the typical causal reading (Traugott & König 1991: 195). These cases of inferred causation show the workings of human cognition in construal of the world affairs. In other words, the causal relation is not warranted in the real world but exists only in the mind of the speaker.

This concept of subjectification has been further refined by attributing directionality to the process and by establishing diverse levels where this procedural mechanism operates, e.g. external, internal and textual levels; or propositional, textual, and expressive levels; or ideational and interpersonal levels (cf. Traugott 1989, Traugott & König 1991, Stein & Wright 1995, Traugott & Dasher 2002, inter alia, and papers presented at the 2005 FITIGRA Conference in Leuven, Belgium).

In one of the early studies of subjectification, Traugott (1982: 257) hypothesized that meaning change is unidirectional and may proceed along the path as in (3):

(3) propositional > (textual >) expressive

The levels in the unidirectional change are in fact based on Halliday

and Hasan's (1976) proposal that there are three functional domains of language, i.e. "ideational", "textual", and "interpersonal" components.

Traugott (1989: 34-35) and Traugott and König (1991: 208-209) propose three semantic-pragmatic tendencies that may be summarized as in the following:

(4) a. Semantic-pragmatic Tendency I:
　　　Meanings based in the external described situation
　　　> Meanings based in the internal
　　　(evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) situation
　　b. Semantic-pragmatic Tendency II:
　　　Meanings based in the described external or
　　　internal situation > Meanings based in the textual
　　　situation
　　c. Semantic-pragmatic Tendency III
　　　Meanings tend to become increasingly situated in
　　　the speaker's subjective belief-state/attitude toward
　　　the situation

As shown in (4), the three different levels of situations, i.e. external, textual, and internal situations, are proposed. The subjectification phenomena along these levels tend to move toward more abstract levels of situations. These tendencies well capture the directionalities exhibited by the changes in the development of lexical and grammatical meanings, e.g. of temporal *after* from spatial *after;* of subordinating *after* from spatial/temporal *after;* of connectives (e.g. *since* of causality, and *though* of concessivity), and of lexical forms marking preference/denial (e.g. *prefer, rather,* etc.). Recent research shows that subjectification may intersect both grammaticalization and lexicalization (Rhee 2007a, 2007b).

In recent years many instances of semantico-functional change attested in grammaticalization have been analyzed with recourse to

subjectification, notably those involving development of adpositions, connectives, and many other grammatical formants (Rhee 2005). However, it has not yet been discussed to date how 'heterosemous' words, i.e. those sharing an identical origin (cf. Lichtenberk 1991, Heine 1997), can diverge as a result of differential application of subjectification in the course of grammaticalization, and this paper intends to fill this gap.

3. Grammaticalization of *For* and *Before*

English prepositions *for* and *before* are of long origin both attested in OE as far back as ca. 1000 in such literatures as *Beowulf* and *Cædmon's Genesis*. In the earliest data, *for* is attested as a preposition, but *before* is attested as a preposition or an adverb, a fact suggesting that in those times *for* had been fully grammaticalized as a preposition (and further as a conjunction in later times, i.e. the 12th century), whereas *before* was experiencing a change from the more conservative adverbial use into the more grammaticalized prepositional use.[1] Both of these English prepositions were derived from a common root, i.e. Old Teutonic **fora* 'front' or OHG *fora* 'front' (Oxford English Dictionary 1991, OED henceforth).

These prepositions, though derived from an identical source lexeme, are exemplars *par excellence* of exhibiting contrastive properties in their development. In Modern English, *for* is primarily used to designate advantageous/beneficial relationship between the figure and the ground (e.g. *This flower is for you*), whereas *before* is

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1) Even though *for* only showed prepositional use and did not show adverbial use in OE, the adverbial use was carried by its relative *fore* in OE. This indicates that there occurred a phonological reduction that accompanied the functional change (and 'decategorialization' Hopper 1987) from an adverbial into a preposition. It should be noted, however, that the transition was not sharp and *fore* was also used as a preposition until as late as 1840 judging from the OED citations.

primarily specialized for the designation of spatial or, more productively, temporal anteriority (e.g. *You must arrive here before 7*).

3.1 Grammaticalization of *For*

As indicated earlier, English preposition *for* was derived from a lexeme designating a spatial concept 'the front'.[2] Human cognitive workings are such that a spatial concept is susceptible to extension to more abstract concepts, e.g. time, quality, etc. (Heine et al. 1991, Heine 1997), and the fact that *for* also underwent such abstraction process is evident in that *for* in Modern English has the benefactive/advantage meanings as its primary meaning, and the spatial location meaning is hardly discernible.

An investigation into the semantic change pattern exhibited by *for* drawn upon the historical data (largely from OED) reveals that it has undergone a series of semantic change. This is well illustrated in the following examples (taken from OED).

(5) a. For þæs ea5um, þe þe æsca tir æt guþe for5eaf! (1000, Cædmon's Gen. 2108)

  'For the eyes who gave the honor of spears to you in battle'

  b. Moni mon.. is erm for worlde and uniseli for gode. (1175, Lamb. Hom. 113)

  'Many man... is wretched (poor) for world and unblessed for god.'

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c. Ic wat þone man on Criste, þe wæs ᵹe-gripen nu for

    feowertyne ᵹearum. (1000, Leg. Fursæus)

    'I knew the man in Christ who was seized then for 14 years.'

In examples above, all of which are among the earliest attestations, *for* in (5a) and (5b) has the primary meaning of designating a spatial relationship of anteriority, and may be best interpreted as 'in front of' (in (5a)) and 'in the presence/sight of' (in (5b)). Similarly, *for* in (5c) marks the temporal relationship of anteriority, i.e. 'before in time' or 'duration of time before'.

    Following examples show different types of relationship between the entities involved:[3]

(6) Representation

    a. Se for ealle spræc feonda mengu. (1000, Guthlac 171).

        '(So did he,) who spake for all the multitude of fiends...'

    b. An, for ham alle, Onswerede ant seide. (1225, Leg. Kath. 952)

        'And for them all answered and said.'

    The 'representation' relation refers to a state of affairs where an object is used to represent another object that is associated in diverse manners, of which the most prominent is the metonymic relation.

(7) Cause/Reason

    a. Wen ic, þæt ᵹe for wlenco, nalles for wræcsiðum ac for

        hiᵹe-þrymmun Hroðᵹar sohton. (Beowulf 338)

        "Tis plain that for prowess, not plunged into exile, for

        high-hearted valor, Hrothgar ye seek!'

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3) For the interest of space, translations are given only for the examples that are not formally transparent and not easily interpretable. Some translations contain expressions found in the old parallel texts for the interest of increased interpretability, that are not present in the cited example.

b. Þa wæs Iethro bliþe for eallum þam godum þe Drihten dyde Israhela folce. (1000, Ælfric. Exod. xviii. 9)

'Jethro was glad for all the things the Lord did for the people of Israel.'

The 'cause/reason' relations, which are often conceptually and linguistically indistinguishable, refer to a situation where something is taken as responsible for the occurrence of a state or an event as a motivating factor.

(8) Substitution/Payment/Penalty

a. He ƽehyrde þæt archelaus rixode on iudea-þeode for ðæne herodem. (1000, Ags. Gosp. Matt. ii.22)

'He heard that Archelaus did reign in Judaea in the room of his father Herod.'

b. Eaƽe for eaƽe and toð for toð. (1000, Ags. Gosp. Matt. v. 38)

'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'

The 'substitution/payment/penalty' relations refer to diverse situations: where one thing is presented as substituting another, or where one thing is expended in payment for, or in penalty of another. Therefore, in these relations the essential concept is 'replacement', be it for merely substitution or for compensation.

(9) Support/Favor

a. And Drihten fiht for eow. (Ælfric Exod. xiv. 14)

'And the Lord will fight for you.'

b. How shulde men fiƽte for a persone þat þei witen not [etc.]? (1380, Wyclif Sel. Wks. III. 363)

'How should men fight for a person that they do not know?'

The 'support/favor' relations, as shown in examples above, fundamentally involve the 'for the benefit of' concept. This should be closely related to the afore-mentioned 'substitution/payment/penalty' relations in that the latter are susceptible to the interpretation involving benefit.

(10) Preparation/Purpose
    a. Nys þeos untrumnys na for deðae ac for godes wuldre. (1000, Ags. Gosp. John xi.4)
      'This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God.'
    b. Berynge in theyr handes flowres and roses for a token. (1489, Caxton, Sonnes of Aymon ix. 210)

The 'preparation/purpose' relations are also closely related to the 'support/favor' relations in that both categories refer to willful act of a sentient agent carried out for the benefit of the recipient. The difference, however, is that in the 'preparation/purpose' relation, the psychological distance between an act and the cause it serves is more distant (thus 'preparation' for a future event more amenable) than in the case of the 'support/favor' relation, in which the distance may be closer.

(11) Destination
    a. She asked whi they were departed for the kynges courte. (1489, Caxton Sonnes of Aymon i. 36)
    b. Her Majesties fleete nowe in service for the west indyes. (1595, Drake. Will in Wills Doctor's Com. 77)

The 'destination' relation refers to a more specific, and thus more restricted, relation primarily used in relation to journeys. Therefore,

the destination relation may be a type of specialized 'purpose' relation, the purpose being arriving at a particular location.

(12) Appointment/Appropriation/Fitness
    a. Dethe withouten ende, the whiche was ordeyned for us. (1400, Maundev. Prol. 2)
    b. It is not for kings to drinke wine. (1611, Bible Prov. xxxi. 4)

The 'appointment/appropriation/fitness' relations refer to a situation where one thing is taken with reference to the suitability of another's being situated in a particular state or an event. The combination of the notions of 'suitability' and 'benefit' may give rise to the notion of 'appointment'.

(13) Advantage/Disadvantage
    a. Ic þæt for worulde ᵹebolade. (1000, Cynew. Crist 1423)
      'I endured (suffered) that for the world.'
    b. This.. bodes ill for the peace of Europe. (1883, Daily News. 22 Sept.)

The final category of relations, as exemplified above, is that of the 'advantage/disadvantage', where one thing is evaluated with reference to whether it has the favorable quality for the other. Since 'evaluation' *per se* is a subjective judgment of the speaker, the emergence of this meaning is an instance of subjectification.

From the illustration of the examples with diverse semantics, the semantic extension pattern exhibited by *for,* though it should be by no means monolinear in actual progression, is self-evident.[4] The path

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4) The historical data available in OED do not lend support to a theory of monolinear development of these senses. This may be due in part to the fact that such extensions may have occurred before the earliest attestations of the

can be diagrammatically represented as:

(14) [frontal location > temporal anteriority > representation >
cause/reason > support/benefit > purpose > destination > fitness
> advantage/disadvantage]

Diverse semantic change mechanisms operate over this long progression of semantic change, such as metaphor, metonymy, semantic generalization, pragmatic inference, etc. Of particular importance among these is metonymization, a cognitive mechanism of extension of meanings enabled by the contiguity relationship between the original and new meanings.

The metonymization mechanism involved in the extension of *for* shows that certain aspects of an event or a state are given a special focus. For instance, in the change from spatial/temporal anteriority to representation, the human mind is as if saying, "If A is in front of B, A can represent B." In other words, from a state of affairs in which A and B are situated together, and A is seen to be "at the front of" B according to the speaker's visual path, we extract A's ability to represent B. Perhaps this is due to the human propensity to give emphasis on the frontal region rather than the posterior region of an entity, as evidenced by the fact that humans use the portrait of the face, rather than the back, of someone as representing him/her (cf. Heine 1997, Svorou 1993, Lakoff & Johnson 1980). However, even so, this is remarkable considering that the original image schema of the "A in front of B" is not of synecdoche (i.e. part-whole) relations, but of two entities with certain distance between them. Therefore, this representability relation exists only in the human's subjective mind, where two entities, despite certain physical distance

data, and in part to the methodological limitations in listing semantic designations in linear order. However, granting the linear order metaphor as a means of expositive methodology, the discussion as presented here is valid.

between them, are first perceived of forming a single entity, and then conceived of one of them having relatively more quality of certain kind than the other.

It is also noteworthy that, in the sense that metonymization selects a particular aspect through a subjective judgment, metonymization and subjectification are inseparably intertwined (cf. Rhee 2002). As a matter of fact, if metonymization should be taken as including conceptual contiguity as suggested in Traugott and König (1991), subjectification is in fact a type of metonymization.

This type of the combined operation of metonymization and subjectification, as the one discussed above, is also well illustrated in other instances of semantic extensions as shown in (15), where the arrow (>) denotes the metonymy-based inference through subjectification.

(15) A for B
      a. A is at the front of B.
      b. > A represents B.
      c.   > B is the cause of A.
      d.   > A supports B.
      e.   > B is the purpose of A.
      f.   > B is the destination of A.
      g.   > A/B is appropriate for A/B.
      h.   > A is advantageous to B.

The semantic extension from (15a) to (15h), taken as happened in one fell swoop, would show a rather drastic change, i.e. from "front" to "advantage". However, it should be noted that no semantic change occurs with a leap: there are many intermediate stages that ultimately lead the direction of the meaning to "advantage". The links between any two adjacent stages between (15a) through (15h) are not deterministically motivated, but are simply results of highlighting a

particular aspect that may be associated with the event/state designated by the sense of the previous stage. In this sense, the connection among the members along the progression is reminiscent of the family resemblance categories (Wittgenstein 1953).

In the progression of the semantic change, the development of 'disadvantage' falls outside the natural way of metonymic inference. The emergence of the sense of 'disadvantage' may have to do with the strategic use of irony as a figure of speech, as instantiated by the following examples in OED.

(16) a. I will swinge his Jacket for him. (1740, Xmas Entertainm. ii. 12)
b. It would have been a mercy if I hadn't broken some of his bones for him. (1855, Smedley. H. Coverdale liii)

It is also to be noted that since the emergence of a new sense resulting from conventionalization of pragmatic inferences based on metonymization does not necessarily render the previous senses obsolete, diverse meanings may occur at any synchronic state, thus accounting for the notorious polysemy phenomenon for grammatical forms such as *for*.[5]

3.2 Grammaticalization of *Before*

As for *before* in Modern English, it is largely used to show the 'earlier in time' relation or the 'in front of' relation between the two referenced entities or events. This usage is commonly applicable to

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5) In fact, several other semantic domains of *for* are listed in OED, but these are often the result of the interaction with the forms co-occurring at its syntagmatic level, i.e. idioms and their semantic extension. Despite the fact that they may constitute an excellent research topic, they are not addressed in this paper for the sake of expositive simplicity.

the prepositional usage as well as the adverbial usage. Considering that it was originally derived from the lexeme signifying 'the front', this prepositional meaning does not show much semantic change. The change can be exemplified by the following data taken from OED.

(17) Sequence in Space

    a. And Drihten fór beforan him and swutelode him þone weȝ.
       (1000, Ælfric. Ex. xiii. 21)
       'And the Lord went before them and led them the way.'

    b. We got before the wind to the Cape of Good Hope. (1598, W. Phillip. Linschoten's Trav. Garner III. 23)

    c. [He] ȝehyrde myccle meniȝo him beforan feran. (971. Blickl. Hom. 15)
       '[He] heard a great multitude go before him.'

As shown above, the 'sequence in space' relation is among the earliest represented by *before*. The relation simply refers to a situation where an object is located in the frontal region of the other.

(18) Sequence in Time

    a. Se þe to cummene is æfter me wæs geworden beforan me.
       (1000, Ags. Gosp. John i. 15)
       'He that comes after me was born before me.'

    b. He shall newenn cumenn forþ Biforenn Cristess come. (1200, Ormin 177)
       'He shall newly come forth before Christ comes.'

The next category is the 'sequence in time' relation, where one object is temporally located in front of the other, i.e. one event occurred earlier in time than the other. The emergence of the 'sequence in time' relation is a common and natural development from

the 'space in time' relation (Heine et al. 1991). The relationship between the space and time is so close that the space-time relations with respect to locomotion may in fact be inseparable (Hopper & Traugott 2003[1993], Bybee et al. 1994).

(19) View/Mental view
　　a. [Hi] worhton calle þa wundru.. beforan Faraone. (1000, Ælfric. Ex. xi 10)
　　　'(They) did all these wonders before Pharaoh.'
　　b. Fæder ic synɜude on heofon & beforan ðe. (1000, Ags. Gosp. Luke xv 21)
　　　'Father, I have sinned before heaven and you.'

The 'view/mental view' relations consist of physical and mental visibility, i.e. the latter is a metaphorized version of the former. In this relation, one object, by virtue of being located in front of the other, either physically or mentally, is taken as visible to the other, which is capable of visual perception.

(20) Claiming attention/Prospect
　　a. That which now lies before you is to shew, how your abrenunciation is preparatory to the love of God. (1711, Ken. Div. Love)
　　b. Land liþ ætforan eow. (1000, lfric. Gen. xx 15)
　　　'The land lies before you.'

The 'claiming attention/prospect' relations are interesting in that the semantics of *before* incorporates abstract notions such as conation (of willful act) and evaluation (as to the progression of world affairs). In this relation, an object located in front of the other is taken as having the potential of claiming the viewer's attention or of eliciting

the viewer's judgment as to its relevance to the future.

(21) Superiority

    a. Se schene biforen alle oðre. (1230, Hali Meid. 19)

      'That shines before all others.'

    b. Al that a man hath bifore a best. (1300, Wright. Pop. Sc. 367)

      'All that a man has before a beast'

The 'superiority' relation emerges as a result of metaphorization where something placed in front of the other is conceived of as more important than the other. In this metaphor, two compared objects do not necessarily occupy a physical space, but are assigned to relative positions through human conceptualization of deixis, where the conceptual systems with respect to spatial orientations operate (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).

(22) Preference

    a. He menskeð ham se muchel biforen alle þe oðre. (1230, Hali Meid. 23)

      'He revered them more than all others.'

    b. Þow schalt not haue bifore me alyen Goddis. (1380, Wyclif. Sel. Wks III. 83)

      'You should not have other gods before me.'

The final category of relations is that of 'preference'. This is a natural outgrowth from the 'superiority' sense, since human propensity is such that humans have a natural desire for their acquiring superiority or obtaining something superior to others. In this conceptualization, an entity before another is preferable.

As shown in the long catalogue of examples above, *before* has undergone a series of semantic change, albeit differently and relatively

weakly as compared with *for*. Such semantic change may be diagrammatically represented as the following:

(23) [frontal location > temporal anteriority > visibility > prospect > superiority > preference]

As was the case with *for*, the semantic change of before also seem to have been enabled by metonymization, in that only certain aspects of an event or a state are focused in the course of semantic extension. This process, in exact analogy with the case of *for,* involves both metonymization and subjectification as shown in the following series of inferences:

(24) a. A is before B.
      b. > A is visible (physically or mentally)
      c.   > A is noteworthy.
      d.   > A is preferable.

As was the case with *for,* the linkage in the inferential chains is rather arbitrary. For instance, when an entity is situated in front of an entity, there is nothing compelling that brings forth the interpretation that the two are in the visibility relationship (or in case of metaphor, under the potential of cognizance by the one located in the posterior region). However, the language users choose to employ such an interpretation as part of enrichment of the meaning of linguistic signal. In particular, when the one located at the posterior to the other is a person, and thus has the potential of visual perception, such a visibility relationship may be naturally inferable.

Likewise, there is nothing that guarantees the noteworthiness of an entity from the mere fact that it is within the scope of the viewer's vision. However, the language user chooses to attribute such a desirable quality to the entity, a decision based on the subjectified

relationship between these two entities.[6]

Furthermore, when the entity is considered to be 'good', further subjectification occurs when this 'goodness' is evaluated in a comparative viewpoint, i.e. "this is better than other comparable options." In this context, it is noteworthy that English word *priority,* primarily used with reference to importance and preferability, originated from Latin *prior* which denoted the temporal notion of 'former' and evaluative notion of 'superiority'.

As shown in the foregoing discussion, all these decisions that drive the semantics of *before* to the various meanings are unequivocal instances of subjectification.[7]

4. Discussion

In the preceding discussion, it was shown that *for* and *before* have undergone a similar subjectification process whereby the speaker attributes subjective meanings to a particular aspect of an event or a state. We now turn to a discussion of the differences of the two forms with respect to their semantic change patterns.

4.1 Differential Subjectification

It has been noted earlier in the discussion that in Modern English, *for* is primarily used for the beneficial relationship as in "I bought these flowers *for* you.", whereas *before* is primarily used to encode

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6) Eom (2007) provides an excellent discussion as to how vision, perception, interest, and other categories are conceptually related and mutually motivated.

7) As an anonymous reviewer points out, it should be noted that the meaning that was developed last, i.e. the most recently developed meaning, is not the one that is most widely used, as is well illustrated by the fact that the primary meaning of *before* is the temporal anteriority meaning, rather than the preferability meaning. There is nothing deterministic that forces the last meaning to be the primary meaning of the grammaticalizing form.

the temporal anteriority relationship as in "You must return home *before* dark." Considering that both of these predominant senses are derived from the source lexeme denoting "the front", we can suggest a rough generalization as the following:

(25) The pattern of *for:*
    If A is at the front of B, A is for the good of B.

(26) The pattern of *before:*
    If A is at the front of B, A is earlier than B.

The pattern in (26) seems to evoke 'metaphor' as a cognitive mechanism. The metaphor-theory with (26) seems amenable. However, considering that when A is at the front of B, we tend to interpret the situation more dynamically, A's being earlier in time (maybe taken to locate itself there) than B is quite understandable. In this sense, the [space > time] metaphor interpretation is always susceptible to the [space+time > time] metonymy interpretation (cf. Hopper & Traugott 2003[1993], and Bybee et al. 1994 for a similar discussion of English futurity marker *be going to*).

    More importantly, however, *for* and *before* in their more local semantic extension seem to employ different kinds of subjectification, which may be contrasted as the following (largely a restatement of (14) and (23) above):

(27)   a. *for:*
        [anteriority > representation > cause/reason > support/benefit >
         purpose > destination > fitness > advantage/disadvantage]
        b. *before:*
        [anteriority > visibility > prospect > superiority > preference].

As shown in (27), very different kinds of subjectification have

occurred to *for* and *before,* respectively.

4.2 Differential Specialization

Prepositions *for* and *before* show different levels of textual dominance. For instance, according to the MICASE Corpus, a spoken English corpus consisting of about 1.7 million words developed by University of Michigan, the total token frequency of *for* amounts to 10,523, whereas that of *before* is only 1,134. According to Johansson & Hofland (1989), an analysis of the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (LOB), *for* as a preposition ranks fourth, and *before* ranks twenty-first. The gap of token frequency suggests that *for* is more general in semantics and thus have larger range of use context, as compared to *before*.[8]

Furthermore, *for* specializes in the benefit-marking function, whereas *before* in the temporal-anteriority marking function. Even though *for* is used predominantly for the benefit-marking, it is also used in such contexts where the benefactivity is considerably or entirely bleached. On the other hand, the anteriority relationship marked by *before* proper is largely restricted to the temporal relationship, and the spatial relationship more frequently marked by its competitors *in front of* and *at the front of*. For this reason, the conceptual territory taken up by *before* is considerably smaller.

In terms of extension across grammatical categories, the two prepositions seem to have traveled the paths of [Noun > Adverb > Preposition > Conjunction]. However, their specializations in Modern English seem to be different as shown in the following token

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8) A caveat, however, is that the mere difference in token frequency cannot be an absolute index of differential degree of grammaticalization, because a comparison of two forms with respect to differential levels of grammaticalization should consider other factors, such as the categories of the concepts the forms designate, the alternative forms designating the same concept, etc. (cf. Hoffmann 2005).

frequency from the LOB Corpus (based on Johansson and Hofland 1989):

(28)

Category	*for*	*before*
Adverb	42	177
Preposition	8,775	488
Conjunction	488	396
Total	9,305	1,061

The figures in (28) show that *for* is primarily specialized in its prepositional function, whereas *before* is more versatile across adverbial, conjunctive, and prepositional functions in the ascending order of frequency. The total token frequency difference (i.e. 9,305 vs. 1,061) may be taken as an index (though not in absolute terms) of relative degree of grammaticalization of these two forms. The relative degree of grammaticalization may be further indexed by such variables as the semantic generality and phonological weight (cf. Rhee 2003 for a discussion of English prepositions with respect to these issues).

5. Conclusion

This paper addressed the issues of subjectification as attested in the course of semantic change of *before* and *for*. Subscribing to a quantitative and qualitative research method and drawing upon diachronic and synchronic data, this research shows that the differential levels of the use frequency, the degree of grammaticalization, and the semantic complexity as displayed by these two grammatical formants, both offspring of a single lexical source, in fact go hand in hand, and that the observed disparities between these two forms are ultimately attributable to the differential levels

and paths of subjectification.

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Seongha Rhee
Department of English Linguistics
College of English
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
270 Imun-dong Dongdaemun-gu
Seoul 130-791 Korea
Phone: +82-2-2173-3171
Fax: +82-2-959-4581
E-mail: srhee@hufs.ac.kr