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Pragmatics of Metaphor*

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The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.
He maketh me to lie down in green pasture:
He leadeth me beside the still waters.

(*Psalm 23:1-2, KJV*)

The Clinton administration put new military and economic pressure on North Korea Monday to try to pry open suspect nuclear sites for international inspection.

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0. Introduction

Since the times of Aristotle, who praised the mastery of metaphor as a sign of genius¹⁾, there has been a large body of literature on the study of metaphor. For example, three bibliographies — Shibles (1971), Van Noppen et al (1985), and Van Noppen and Hols (1990) — jointly list some 12,000 books and papers currently available.²⁾ Considering such a large body of literature for a single topic, this figure alone is indicative of the level of attraction metaphor offers. Metaphor, or

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1) "The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others. It is the mark of genius." (*Rhetoric*, 3)

2) Shibles (1971) has about 4000 entries for pre-1970 literature. Van Noppen et al (1985) lists post-1970 literature up to 1985, and Van Noppen and Hols (1990) entries are from 1985 through 1990.

figurative speech in general, has been a challenge to many disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and literature as well as linguistics. There have even been studies that relate the metaphor and metaphorical concepts to visual art (e.g., Aronson 1987) and film (e.g., Caldwell 1986). The list of disciplines expands to education, counseling, music, drama, and many others.³⁾ Despite such an overwhelmingly large volume of studies in many disciplines regarding metaphor, several recurring central issues seem to be far from being resolved to date and it does not seem too feasible that they will be resolved in the near future. Particularly in linguistics, the sharp division of two opposing attitudes toward metaphor is obvious — the appreciators and the depreciators, according to Black's (1979) labeling. Considering that metaphor plays a significant role in natural-language communication, and that linguistics by definition is a discipline for study of language, any linguistic theory that lacks the proper handling of metaphor will be incomplete. An adequate theory of language should address the main issues of metaphor such as 'What is a metaphor?', 'How is it produced?', and 'How is it interpreted?'

The first half of this essay is largely intended to be a critical review of these fundamental issues as proposed in some of the main theories, introducing the main claims made by the proponents and the criticisms by the opponents, adding my criticisms and views as appropriate. In the latter half, I sketch an alternative analysis. In this alternative analysis two main reconciliations are attempted: one among the three major theories of metaphor, and the other between linguistic and anthropological linguistic (ethnographic) approaches. I believe that they are not antithetical after all as some might suppose.

I. What is Metaphor?

1.1 Toward a Definition of Metaphor

Emerson ⁴⁾ said "The whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind." Similarly, Shelley is known to have said "Language is vitally metaphorical."⁵⁾ Though these observations are made not by linguists but poets, their validity has not been seriously challenged by linguists. Despite the wide-held admiration toward metaphor (as held by Aristotle), the views on metaphor as a topic of serious scholastic research have been generally negative (also exemplified by Aristotle). It is only recently that the topic was seen with a positive view.

3) A good reference for the related fields of metaphor studies can be found in the bibliographies named above.

4) In his "The poetic endeavor".

5) In his "Defense of Poetry".

1.1.1 Metaphor: Linguistic Parasite

Despite the alleged and commonly accepted pervasiveness of metaphor in our language, ironically, metaphor is often thought to be deviation of and parasitic upon the normal language use. Since many hold this view, especially in linguistics, metaphor has been relegated to a subject of less importance or considered to be a topic of some other discipline. In this view, also named as the classical view, a metaphor is defined to be a sentence involving violations of linguistic rules, particularly those of selectional restrictions, by equating the two terms having incompatible semantic features or attributes. For example, Carnap (1955) claimed that a metaphor, normally construed, is conceptually absurd resulting from the violation of linguistic rules, and Percy (1958) viewed a metaphor as an assertion of one thing that it is something else and therefore bound to be an inevitably wrong assertion. Many students of metaphor, indeed, think that the violation of linguistic rules is a defining characteristic of metaphor, and use it as a signal of a metaphorical statement. Fraser (1979) proposes a moderate version of this view, not stigmatizing metaphor as a literally 'wrong' sentence, though adopting the literal vs. non-literal distinction. He offers a working definition that a metaphor is an instance of the non-literal use of language in which the intended propositional content must be determined by the construction of an analogy (p. 176). He adds that since there are many instances where no semantic exceptionality is involved, the speaker's intention that the expression be taken non-literally must be taken into account. The definition using the notion of analogy is of a long tradition since Aristotle, who thought of metaphor as a statement of comparison and similarity based on analogy, and defined it as the transfer of a word belonging to something else. The majority of metaphor students followed this tradition, at least until recently, by defining it as an implied comparison between two things of unlike nature that have a third thing in common, the *tertium comparationis*, or considering metaphor 'seeing-as'.

1.1.2 Metaphor: Essence of Language

Others, on the other hand, honor the power of metaphor in human language, and consider metaphor inseparable from the human language, a view sometimes called the romantic view, the origin of which is attributed to Plato. This view gained some support in the 20th century. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) put forth a strong claim that language and the concepts manifest in language are metaphorical by nature, and metaphor is an omnipresent principle in language (also in Richards 1936). According to this positive view, metaphor is essential in language use, and so, they contend that if a theory of language is to be satisfactory, it should be properly equipped to handle metaphor. The proponents of this view maintain that metaphor is not parasitic upon or derivative from its literal counterpart, and that certain metaphors have power to present insight into the world in a distinctive and irreplaceable way. Black (1979) argues;

[T]o assume that a metaphorical utterance presents something as what it is plainly not — or to

assume that its producer really does intend to say one thing while meaning something else — is to beg disastrously a prime question by accepting the misleading view of a metaphor as some kind of deviation or aberration from proper usage.

Somebody seriously making a metaphorical statement — say, “The Lord is my Shepherd” — might reasonably claim that *he meant just what he said*, having chosen the words most apt to express his thought, attitudes, and feelings, and was by no means guilty of uttering a crass absurdity. (p. 22: emphasis mine)

Black (1979) contends that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to become a metaphor, just as there are no such conditions for a thing to be a game, as argued in Wittgenstein (1953). Black points out the difficulty of defining metaphor or establishing criteria by saying that recognition of a metaphor depends on our knowledge of what it is for something to be a metaphor, and on our judgment of preference of metaphorical interpretation over the literal one. Rumelhart (1979), Miller (1979), and Paivio (1979) share the idea that there is no cognitive ground for a sharp distinction between the literal statement and the metaphorical statement.

The difficulty of defining metaphor is often further complicated by other closely related figures of speech, such as euphemism, hyperbole, irony, metonymy, simile, synecdoche, understatement, etc. In a wide definition, metaphor will be a hypernym and all the other categories will be subsumed. In a narrow definition, metaphor is a hyponym of the figures of speech parallel with the others given above. For example, Amprimoz (1984) gives a discussion of a definition by Le group μ , that ‘a metaphor is the product of two synecdoches’. He points out the weakness of the definition — even though he uses the same notion for his definition of metaphor in set theory — because it may be simply transposing the problem, due to the fact that it uses a notion of synecdoche, the definition of which may not be agreed upon.

It seems that whatever its definition may be, there are two hard-to-resolve problems involved. One concerns the boundary with anomalous sentences. In other words, where does a statement cease to be a figurative statement and crosses over to become a ‘wrong’ sentence? The border here does not have a sharp demarcation line because it involves many factors such as intentions, interpretations, contexts, appropriateness, etc. Therefore, the same metaphorical statement can yield more than one metaphorical interpretation, or can have both literal and non-literal readings, which is sometimes the exact effect the producer intends to create through a careful design.

Another problem, as discussed above, concerns the boundary with the so-called ‘literal’ sentences. Even though some argue that the distinction between the literal sentences and the metaphorical sentences is an artifact of research methods or simply of tradition, such counter-claims lack intuitive acceptability; that is, they are perceived to be ‘different’ by the hearer and this difference is often the principal intention of the speaker. Those who claim that the distinction

between the two is difficult seem to commit a *non sequitur* by inferring that things difficult to differentiate are things not different. Conceding that there is no effective or plausible tool to differentiate them, they still have the onus of explaining why they, now allegedly in the same category, are still different.

There are some empirical reasons for inadequacy of the claim that the distinction of metaphor with literal expressions is not well-grounded. If metaphors are as straightforward as other uses of language, then how can we identify them as 'metaphors' at all? — it amounts to rejecting the very existence of a genre named as metaphor. Also, as M. Krifka (p.c.) points out, one must identify 'frozen' metaphor as a subkind that belongs to a more regular type of language use.

Relevant to this issue, one interesting observation comes from Danesi (1989) in his neurological study of metaphor. Through clinical studies, involving hemispheric patients, it has been observed that RH (right hemispheric) patients are far less capable of understanding metaphors.⁶⁾ He offers the generalizations that, unlike most language functions and verbal memory, which are controlled by the left hemisphere of the brain (a well-established fact in the discipline), the comprehension of prosodic features of language and figurative discourse is controlled by the right hemisphere. Based on this, he proposes an interhemispheric model which posits a RH locus for processing the more 'imaginative' and 'creative' components of a metaphor — based on sensorial or bodily experiences — and a LH locus for the transformation of such components into abstract principles of semantic organization. Therefore, it seems that for reasons of intuition and neurological evidence, the distinction between the 'literal' and 'non-literal' should be maintained.

In conclusion, an appropriate definition of metaphor should include the cross-categorical comparison and non-literality of its meaning (which, however, will raise questions of definition of category and non-literality again, which we will not pursue here). Ryle's (1949) 'category mistake' and better known 'selection-restrictions' are relevant here.

6) He gives an example of an experiment conducted by Winner & Gardner (1977), in which RH patients and normals were given a series of metaphors and were asked to select one of the pictures representing the appropriate meaning. One such example given is:

Sentence: "A heavy heart can really make a difference."

Pictures: 1. a person crying 2. a person staggering under the weight of a huge red heart.
3. a 500 lb weight 4. a red heart

In this experiment, it was revealed that RH patients made metaphorical responses 5 times less than the normals. More detailed experiments of this kind are discussed in Stachowiak (1985).

1.2 Typology of Metaphor

Classifying metaphors into subclasses crucially depends on how we define metaphor, because establishing the criterion of membership for a large class is the logical prerequisite for dividing the members into subclasses. However, as is commonly accepted, metaphors are hard to define, but relatively much easier to recognize. The following are some of the proposed classifications of metaphor, even though most of them do not propose a definition for it.

1.2.1 Binary Classifications

Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in their influential work that aroused considerable enthusiasm for metaphor studies resulting in a large number of publications, divided metaphors into two classes by way of metaphoric labels: live metaphor and dead metaphor. The live metaphor is one we live by. It is a reflection of systematic metaphorical concepts that structure our actions and thoughts, and it is conventionally fixed within our lexicon. Such metaphors as *An argument is a war* or *Time is money*, etc. are live metaphors. On the other hand, the dead metaphor is idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated, and so it does not play a significant role in our conceptual system. Such metaphors as *A mountain is a man* are dead metaphors. These lack the productivity and so *the foot of the mountain* is one of very rare instantiations from the above metaphorical concept, i.e., *A mountain is a man*. Such binary distinction of metaphor is reminiscent of an earlier study by Bréal (1897 [1964]) who used terms like 'novel' and 'frozen'. (It is important to note that while he proposed these two labels, he also added that many everyday metaphors fall somewhere between the two.)

1.2.2 Tertiary Classification

Black (1979) argues that such binary distinction of metaphors based on the prevalence and manifest versatility is "no more helpful than, say, treating a corpse as a special case of a person" (p.26). Instead, he offers a tertiary classification: extinct, dormant, and active. An extinct metaphor is one whose etymology, genuine or fancied, suggests a metaphor beyond resuscitation (e.g. a muscle as a little *mouse*; or *falling in love*); a dormant metaphor is one where the original, now usually unnoticed, metaphor can be usefully restored (e.g. obligation as a kind of *bondage*); and an active metaphor is one that is actively metaphoric (man as a *thinking reed*), which is also called a 'vital' metaphor.

Another three-way classification is given in Miller (1979). However, unlike Black's classification based on etymological recoverability of the meaning (therefore, a kind of aging process of the metaphor), Miller's categorization is more syntactic-based. He gives three classes as nominal metaphor, predicative metaphor, and sentential metaphor. A nominal metaphor is one where a nominal concept is expressed by means of a metaphorically used noun phrase, as in *The*

lion is the king of beasts. A predicate metaphor is one where a predicate concept is expressed by a metaphorically used predicate phrase as in *The rich performs leisure*. A sentential metaphor is one where the entire sentential concept is inferred from the context, as in *The rock became brittle with age* when used to talk about a person. The last type has relevance with 'implicature' in Grice (1975). Miller summarizes the three types in the following way (p.233):

Type 1: Nominal metaphors	BE (x,y) when an x is not a y.
Type 2: Predicative metaphors	G(x) when x is not G.
Type 3: Sentential metaphors	G(y) when y is not a discourse referent.

Miller's classification is a very efficient one for his formal representation of metaphors. His analysis will be discussed in the following sections.

1.2.3 Quaternary Classification

Perrine (1971), on the other hand, uses a four-way typology, based on the four possible combinations of implicit and explicit topics and vehicles.⁷⁾ The four types are as follows:

Type 1. explicit topic and explicit vehicle

- (1) All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely players.

Shakespeare: *As You Like It*

topic: the world

topic: the men and women

vehicle: a stage

vehicle: players

Type 2. explicit topic and implicit vehicle⁸⁾

- (2) Sheathe thy impatience.

Shakespeare: *Merry Wives of Windsor*

topic: impatience

vehicle: sword

Type 3. implicit topic and explicit vehicle

- (3) Night's candles are burnt out.

Shakespeare: *Romeo and Juliet*

topic: stars

vehicle: night's candles

7) These terms, *topic* and *vehicle*, refer to the two main terms (or sometimes, concepts) involved in a statement of metaphor. For example, in a sentence, 'John is a wolf', *John* is the topic and *wolf* is the vehicle. These two terms are labeled in various ways, such as tenor and vehicle (Richards 1936), principle object and accessory (Kames 1846), visual sense and figurative sense (Blair 1965) subject (=independent variable) and transposed term (=dependent variable) (Feltenstein 1941), etc. In his discussion, Perrine uses figurative terms and literal terms instead of topic and vehicle.

8) This Type 2 is the class where selectional restrictions are violated.

Type 4. implicit topic and implicit vehicle

(4) Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die.

Isaiah 22:13

topic: life

vehicle: something to be enjoyed for it lasts for a short time

Perrine's four way classification is interesting and far-reaching, because it is not restricted to 'A is B' form of metaphor. For example, Type 1 includes metaphors from a large variety of syntactic constructions such as genitives (as in *The bird of time has but a little way to flutter*), appositions (as in *Come into the garden, Maud, for the black bat, night, has flown*), vocatives (as in *O wild west wind, thou breath of Autumn's being*), and many others (ibid. p.126).

II. Whose domain is it?

2.1 A Multidimensional Concern

As Ortony (1979a) said in his introductory article "Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem", many students of metaphor from widely varying disciplines have attempted to give an analysis of this 'mysterious' and impregnable subject. In addition to the long history of concern in rhetoric and in philosophy, there has been a growing interest in other disciplines. For example, in psychology — especially in cognitive psychology — the comprehension processes of metaphors not only constitute an interesting challenge but their specification also constitutes power of theories of language comprehension in general (p.4). Growing concern with metaphor is very noticeable in anthropology, too. The fact that metaphor is deeply rooted in culture both in production and in interpretation gives a strong support to the linguistic anthropologists (ethnographers). They assert that study of metaphors, and more generally the study of language for the reason that metaphors are so pervasive and inseparable from language, must be viewed only through the proper understanding of the culture. Considering this, it is not surprising that some anthropologists attempt to understand the whole culture as a kind of metaphorical representation, giving primacy to metaphor.

Likewise, in linguistics the trend of growing interest in linguistic performance, which had been relegated to the secondary issue overshadowed by the emphasis on linguistic competence under the Chomskian tradition, led to more studies on non-literal uses of language. In linguistic perspectives, metaphor involves an interesting controversy: whose business is it — pragmatics or semantics?

2.2 Linguistics & Philosophy of Language

The linguistic studies of metaphor come under two groupings: semantic theory and non-semantic theory. The adequacy of the two opposing theories has long been argued. Generally speaking, semantic theorists (e.g., Cohen, Elgin, Sheffler, *inter alia*) treat the metaphorical meaning as a form of sentence meaning or linguistic meaning. On the other hand, non-semantic theorists (Searle, Levin, Fogelin, Davidson, *inter alia*) reject the notion of the metaphorical sentence, and try to use the distinction of speaker's meaning vs. sentence meaning. What underlies this issue is a much more fundamental topic — the philosophy of language, the view of the relationship between language and the world. The philosophy of language can be largely divided into objectivism and subjectivism, even though all different scholars subscribe to them to different degrees. One influential review of the two opposing views is Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in which they propose a third option: experientialism. Their main claims and criticisms are described below:

The objectivist philosophy is not adequate, because in this philosophy, metaphor is a matter of language not of thought and behavior. According to this theory, metaphor can only describe pre-existing isolated similarities and can never create similarity. However, metaphors, both conventional and non-conventional, can create new similarities. Also, this theory is not adequate because it is based on the presupposition that there exists an objective reality and that all entities have clearly defined inherent properties; however, this is not the case as is argued in the prototype and family resemblance theories.⁹⁾ For this reason, the linguistic theories of model-theoretic approaches in meaning and any approaches based on the set theory are inadequate. On the other hand, the subjectivist philosophy is also inadequate because it overemphasizes the private nature of meaning, and because it claims that meanings have no natural structure, and are thus totally unrestricted. The most appropriate theory of metaphor, therefore, should acknowledge that metaphors unite reason and imagination — reason including the ideas of categorization, entailment, and inference; and imagination referring to metaphorical thought which enables one to see one thing through another. This kind of theory can be best accounted for in experientialism, because it gives the primacy to human interaction with the world, and because human understanding comes only through this interaction or experience.

Ortony (1979a) uses different labels for these opposing views: constructivism and non-constructivism, the former corresponding to relativism and the latter, to logical positivism. According to the relativist view (constructivism), any truly veridical epistemological access to reality is denied. Cognition is the result of mental construction on the basis of the constraining influences of human knowledge and language. On the other hand, according to logical positivism

9) They give an example "The fog is in front of the mountain" where there is no clearly delineated *fog* or *mountain* and there is no inherent *front* to a *mountain*.

(non-constructivism), the reality can be precisely described through the medium of language in a manner that is clear, unambiguous, and in principle, testable — reality can, and should, be literally describable (p.1). In regard to the implication of the two theories in the study of metaphor, Ortony points out that in the constructivist approach, the meaning of non-literal uses of language does not constitute a special problem because meaning has to be constructed rather than merely 'read off', while in the non-constructivist approach, metaphors are deviant and their explanation is in terms of violations of linguistic rules.

It is true that model-theoretic semantics approaches in meaning are not capable, at least at the current level of development, of treating some phenomena of language, and need to expand in explanatory power. This, in fact, is currently in progress. In the mid-1970's Montague's program made such an achievement in techniques that the indexical elements can now be handled within model-theoretic semantics.¹⁰⁾ However, it is not certain if such formal approaches can achieve enough explanatory power to deal with connotations.

Such harsh criticisms, however, despite their evident merits on certain points, must be taken with caution. It should be noted that the distinction between objectivism and subjectivism is not absolute. As indicated earlier, all scholars subscribe to them to varying degrees and, therefore, an objectivist may also be a subjectivist to a certain degree. In other words, it is gradient in the continuum with those two philosophies at each end. Therefore, sweeping criticisms based on an extreme version of one of these philosophies may not be valid.

2.3 Semantics vs. Pragmatics

To return to the issue of pragmatics vs. semantics for the proper domain of the study of metaphor, currently the proponents of pragmatics seem to be gaining ground. For a review of these opposing views, a look at the definitions of semantics and pragmatics seems in order.

According to Morris (1938) the branches of the science of semiotics are syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax dealing with the relations of signs to signs; semantics, signs to objects; and pragmatics, signs to interpreters. However, the domain of pragmatics has never been clearly delimited. Generally, semantics is understood to be a branch of study concerned with the meaning of linguistic expression itself and pragmatics with its non-literal meaning. However, the distinction of literal vs. non-literal is not an easy issue, because the question of to what extent the notion of non-literalness should be applied is a thorny one; and because it is difficult to determine how much of the associated meaning is linguistic meaning and how much of it is extralinguistic

10) G. Chierchia & S. McConnell-Ginet (1990) *Meaning and Grammar* is an excellent reference for this issue. (See Chapter 6, in particular.)

meaning. Attempts to define the notion of pragmatics are discussed in detail in Levinson (1983) in which he indicates that semantics is not autonomous with respect to pragmatics, and that pragmatics provides part of the necessary input to a semantic theory. He also claims that if pragmatics is thus logically prior to semantics, a general linguistic theory simply must incorporate pragmatics as a component or level in the overall integrated theory (p. 35). Gazdar's (1979) definition of metaphor is based on the complementary distribution of the two branches by assigning the study of the truth-conditional aspect of meaning to semantics and all other aspects (e.g., implicature, presupposition, inference, etc.) to pragmatics.¹¹⁾

2.3.1 Semantic approach

Cohen (1979) is an interesting work in the semantic approach. Faced with the contention that the underlying mechanism of metaphor is independent from language, as in the case of a picture of a lion on a warrior's shield (supposedly, standing for 'courage') as argued for by Sadock (1979), Cohen draws attention to the important distinctions between metaphor and other similes or non-metaphorical analogy. He argues that metaphors can be properly explained only in *langue* not in *parole*, the theory of language use. In support of his claim he presents five considerations (pp. 64-66). First, if the synchronic description of a language does not explain metaphor, it provides inadequate basis for the diachronic explanation of semantic innovation. For example, without such consideration, there can be no proper explanation as to how the dead metaphors widely present in language such as '*inflamed passion*', '*feeble argument*', etc. came into our language. Second, if a theory of language cannot explain metaphors which are so natural in language, it will never satisfy the intuition of language users, as artificial languages fail to do. Third, metaphor is very different from other types of speech acts in that it is not overridden by the passage from *oratio recta* to *oratio obliqua*.¹²⁾ In other words, metaphor inheres in sentences, not just in speech acts. Fourth, a linguistic theory without account of metaphor will give a very poor contribution to psycholinguistic investigations by failing to provide a strong framework, considering that infants often speak in metaphors without knowing the literal meaning of the sentences. Fifth, since the semantic feature cancellation mechanism is required to deal with certain kinds of non-metaphorical sentences, the analysis of metaphor can exploit it. The only alternative, a method of multiplication to treat the same kind of non-metaphorical sentences (basically employing the method of polysemy treatment) will only multiply the number of relevant lexical entries. For example, in the paired sentences as:

- (5) a. It wasn't an insult because it was not intended as such.

11) Gazdar put it in a very simple formula: Pragmatics = Meaning - Truth Conditions. (p.2)

12) Cohen gives an example of a contrast between the two pairs of speech acts vs. metaphor in *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua*. 'I am sorry.' & 'Tom said he was sorry.' vs. 'The boy next door is a ball of fire.' & 'Tom said that the boy next is a ball of fire.'

- b. It was an unintentional insult.
- (6) a. I tried to warn him but he didn't hear me.
b. I warned him, but he didn't hear me.

the feature cancellation approach will employ only [+INTENTIONAL] for both sentences in (5), and [+UPTAKE] for both sentences in (6); but the feature multiplication approach will have to employ [+INTENTIONAL] and [+UPTAKE] for the (a) sentences respectively, and [±INTENTIONAL] and [±UPTAKE] for the (b) sentences. As a result, in the latter approach, the lexical entry of 'insult' will have insult₁ [+INTENTIONAL], and insult₂ [±INTENTIONAL] — basically a method of polysemy treatment. The multiplication approach is considered inadequate following Ocam's razor for giving too much burden to the lexicon. Based on this, Cohen explicates the feature cancellation process in metaphors.¹³⁾ In so doing, he uses the distinction of 'topic' and 'comment', and the generalization that the direction of cancellation is from topic to comment in the case of metaphorical cancellation, and comment to topic in the case of non-metaphorical cancellation. Some examples are as follows (the topic underlined):

- Lit. (7) It was an unintentional insult. (unintentional > insult)
(8) A stone lion needs no feeding. (stone > lion)
- Met. (9) Their legislative program is a rocket to the moon. (legislative program > rocket)
(10) My wife is the sparkle on summer dew. (wife > sparkle)

According to this approach, the feature [+ANIMATE] or [+HUMAN] of wife in (10) will cancel [-ANIMATE] or [-HUMAN] feature in *sparkle*, and the [-MOBILE] or [-NAVIGATION] (or possibly [-TANGIBLE]) in *legislative program* will cancel the corresponding positive value feature in *rocket*.

Despite the elegance, there seem to be some short-comings here. For example, the directionality of the cancellation, claimed to be so crucial in this approach, is never clear-cut. As Cohen indicated, the directionality is based not solely on the literal vs. metaphorical distinction; it also depends on the extensiveness of the cancellation. Employing non-clear-cut 'relative extensiveness', this analysis limps. Another problem, more fundamentally, is that this approach presupposes that certain semantic features (not with their + or - value) are unequivocal for lexical specification. For example, it is never clear if the features [INTENTIONAL] and [UPTAKE] are semantic features for *insult* and *warn* respectively, or [MOBILE] or [NAVIGATION] or [TANGIBLE] for *legislative program*, rather than some other associative features of the lexemes.

13) This relatively fixed directionality is argued against in Levin (1979).

It seems that the relevance of the features is not according to their idiosyncratic saliency, but is from the interaction (or comparison) of the two terms to establish the contextual relevance. Another problem addresses the distinction of metaphor and oxymoron. Since this approach employs a 'cancellation' process — a powerful tool — it is a puzzle why certain expressions pass the process of cancellation to become a metaphor, while others fail to do so and become an oxymoron.

2.3.2. Pragmatic approach

Unlike Cohen, one of a few lone defenders of the fort of the semantic approach,¹⁴⁾ there are a large number of proponents of the pragmatic approach (e.g. Searle, Levin, Fogelin, Davidson, inter alia). Adopting the generally accepted distinction of the two branches (semantics as concerning the study of the meaning, and pragmatics as concerning the study of language use), their main argument is based on the reasoning that, if metaphor can be properly handled by the semantic theories it should not invoke extra-linguistic knowledge in its account. However, considering that metaphors can indeed be interpreted in many ways depending on the situation, and that they sometimes have both compatible literal and metaphorical meaning, it is not probable that they can be accounted for within the semantic theory proper. For example, Fraser (1979) reports an experimental study in which subjects had very little agreement in the interpretations of metaphors given without contexts. Therefore, the study of metaphor is in the domain of pragmatics, which explores the mechanism of how speakers can consistently exploit the factors of context and manner to convey the utterance meaning given the literal meaning of the expressions used.

III. Some Major Theories of Metaphor

In the history of the study of metaphor, there have been three major theories under which most analyses fall. They are substitution theory, comparison theory, and interaction theory.

3.1 Substitution Theory

From an etymological point of view, metaphor (meaning 'to transfer'¹⁵⁾) is inseparable from the notion of substitution. The idea behind this is that metaphor involves the translation or replacement of the usual linguistic sign (i.e. literal meaning) by an unusual linguistic sign (i.e.

14) For another interesting semantic analysis, see Bosch (1985), an attempt to integrate the metaphor theory into the natural language semantic theory.

15) The term 'metaphor' was derived from the Greek word *metapherein* meaning 'to transfer' or 'to carry over'.

non-literal meaning). The origin of the substitution theory of metaphor dates back to Aristotle. This time-honored theory has been embraced by many students of metaphor. Recently, McGee (1987) used this framework in a study of Lacandon Maya Ritual Song. This theory, as its name suggests, generally regards the entire sentence with a metaphoric expression as replacing some set of literal sentences. For example, a metaphorical sentence *Highways are snakes* shall be substituted by *Highways are long and thin* or *Highways are curvy*. As Aristotle explicitly said, metaphor is only ornamental and unnecessary, and it has inherent ambiguity and obscurity. Therefore, metaphors are unemphatic according to this view. However, one caution is that the substitution involved here is not a process of complete deletion of the literal meaning in favor of the figurative meaning, but a process in which the literal meaning remains as a semantic background for the figurative meaning, resulting in two ideas for one.

There is still another branch in this view, however, which gives a more significant role to metaphor. Here, metaphor is viewed as functioning as a filler for lexical gap — a theory of catachresis.¹⁶⁾ Basso (1981), in his study of metaphors in Western Apache, argues that their metaphorical expressions often correspond to the lexical gaps in the language.¹⁷⁾ Many scholars (Urban, 1939; Ullman, 1962; Alston, 1964; Henle, 1962; and Tryphon as cited in Spengel, 1856, inter alia), even those who reject the substitution theory as a proper theory of metaphor, recognize that metaphors can often function for catachresis. Since there is no complete vocabulary in any language, language users are sometimes confronted with the need of coining a term for the unnamed objects or concepts. In this situation, it seems reasonable that metaphorical use of existing, already familiar, lexemes may be an easier option than other alternatives (such as borrowing or inventing a brand-new word) for many reasons.¹⁸⁾ For example, many 'dead' metaphors or conventional metaphors, such as 'the *leg* of a table', '*rain* of blows' and '*fall in love*' may have come into the language to plug the hole and stayed there once conventionalized. In this respect, the role of metaphor is more than mere embellishment.¹⁹⁾

3.2 Comparison Theory

The arguments by both the proponents and opponents abound in the comparison theory. We

16) Catachresis, according to Black's (1962:33) definition, is 'the use of a word in some new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabulary'.

17) Among such examples given in Basso is a concept for 'living earth dwellers that waste food' for which there is no existing lexeme. Western Apaches use a metaphor '*Carion beetle is a white-man*' to express that concept.

18) These reasons may include the problem of time taken for circulation of new words, nationalistic reluctance, or economy by preventing excessive expansion of vocabulary, etc.

19) M. Kriřka, (p.c.) suggests still another use of metaphor, i.e., metaphorical terms for taboo reasons such as 'honey-pig' for 'bear' in Welsh mythology.

will review the general claims and their criticisms and two revised versions of this theory, one by Ortony and the other by Miller.

3.2.1 Summary of the claims

Comparison theory is closely related to substitution theory in its origin. Black (1979) considers it as a special case of the substitution theory. This theory is also called the implicit (or abbreviated or elliptical) simile theory, since a metaphor of the form 'A is B', according to this view, is inseparable from the simile of the form 'A is like B'. Whatley (1961 as cited in Black, 1962) says that the simile or comparison may be considered as differing from a metaphor only in form. And Bain (1888 as cited in Black, 1962) claims that the metaphor is a comparison implied in the use of a term. Therefore, metaphors derive from analogies and imply the perception of similarities. In a slightly more refined, but still crude, representation of the meaning of a metaphorical statement, 'A is B' will be 'A is like B in the respect R'. For example, the metaphorical statement given above shall be in a form: *Highways are similar to snakes in that both have property X*.

3.2.2. Criticisms

There have been two major criticisms against the comparison theory. One addresses the logical argument, as in Davidson (1978) and Searle (1979). For example, Searle argues that the notion of similarity upon which the comparison theory is built is rather vacuous because any two things will be similar in some sense or other. And for this reason all similarity statements are tautologies, which does not carry any new meaning. The other criticism addresses the ontological argument. According to the comparison theory, metaphoric similarity must be based on objective similarities. This aspect of the theory has been very harshly criticized in Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Searle (1979) also contends that even though similarity often plays a role in comprehension of metaphor, the metaphorical assertion is not necessarily an assertion of similarity. For example, in metaphors of the form S is P which means S is R, there are many cases where there is no object designated by the P term. Also, there need not be any two objects for comparison: in a metaphor *Sally is a block of ice* the utterance does not entail $\exists x$ (x is a block of ice). Searle also shows that if a metaphorical statement is paraphrased into similarity statements according to the comparison theory, the similarity statement can very rarely be exhaustive, and so always leaves one with a feeling that something has been lost; or the similarity statement sometimes cannot avoid being another form of figurative sentence, in which case the explanation becomes circular. Searle also gives an example of paired sentences, *Richard is a gorilla* and its paraphrased *Richard and gorillas are similar in several respects; viz., they are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth*, and argues that the truth conditions are different, because the latter is not true based on the ethological fact that gorillas are in fact shy and sensitive creatures (ibid. p102).

3.2.3. Modified comparison theory

Ortony (1979b & 1980), however, defends the comparison theory and proposes a modified comparison theory, which, according to him, is psychologically and philosophically plausible, and counters the criticisms against the comparison theory.

The criticism has it that the comparison theory implies that the respects (in which the tenor and vehicle are similar) are definite and predetermined, in which case metaphor would have all the precision of scientific statements — which is plainly wrong in reality. Ortony (1980) argues that the important characteristic of metaphors is indeed the quality of open-endedness. However, this quality is not monopolized by metaphors. Critics think that scientific statements are characterized by precision, but precision has nothing to do with the syntactic form of a statement; it has to do with the content. In regard to the criticism that it may turn out to be a tautology (e.g., Davidson 1978; Goodman 1976), Ortony argues that the argument seems to embody an absurd assumption, namely that there is a class of statements which by virtue of their syntactic form alone are necessarily true — similarity statement. He says the argument is empirically false, because there are all kinds of things that are not like all other things, and it is logically nonsensical, because it would entail that the negation of a similarity statement would be self-contradictory,²⁰⁾ and because nobody would be able to use such non-informative statements to achieve their ordinary communicative goals (pp. 5-6).

Ortony's modified comparison theory is based on theories of psychology, committing to the main issue of people's perception on similarity, which has relevance to appearance rather than to reality. He argues that a metaphor is not just a linguistic entity, but it is a more general cognitive entity which could be entertained in thought but which might not, and need not, be realized in language (p.30). And therefore, the variables such as knowledge, context, etc. that can influence perceptions are important and must be taken into account. He concludes that when we say that two things are similar, we do not mean that they are similar in some respect or other, but that they are similar in an important respect. Based on this, he puts forth three claims (p.9):

(a) if two things are perceived as being literally similar, then those two things are perceived as being similar with respect to attributes considered to be important to both of them;

(b) if two things are perceived as being similar metaphorically, then they are not perceived as being literally similar — rather, the attributes that they share are perceived as being more important for the vehicle than they are for the tenor, and/or are themselves related by

20) If, for example, the similarity statement 'Man is like a fox' is a tautology — always true — then its negation 'Man is not like a fox' is self-contradictory — always false.

metaphorical similarity;²¹⁾ and

(c) if two things are perceived as being neither literally similar nor metaphorically similar, then they are not perceived as being similar at all, and the statement expressing their similarity is not merely false, but is in some sense anomalous, too.

3.2.4. Apperception-based comparison theory

Still another elegant analysis within comparison theory is Miller (1979), which I will call the apperception-based comparison theory for convenience.²²⁾ This modified theory poses a strong challenge to the criticisms of the comparison theory for its alleged vagueness. Evaluating the comparison theory in general, Ortony (1979) says that the conventional comparison theory does not have explanatory value unless the difference between the literal comparison and metaphorical comparison is explained (p.11), because the similitude used in comparison often turns out to be metaphorical similitude. However, Miller presents a very clear and rigorous treatment within this comparison theory, by using formal representations. Since this analysis has such merit, it deserves more detailed presentation here.

Miller defends the view that a metaphor is an abbreviated simile, and that the thought provoked is the kind required to appreciate similarities and analogies. (ibid. p.202). As a starting point, he tries to explicate the process of literary understanding by using two mechanisms: mechanism of memory image, which is constructive, and mechanism of a model, which is selective. He calls the combined image/model 'concept' and the constructive/selective processes 'synthesis'. With this background, he discusses metaphor as the following:

Metaphor presents an apperceptive problem. A metaphor that is literally false of the real world can still be added to our image and used to constrain our model, but it creates a tension between our conception of the real world and our conception of the world that the [speaker] had in mind. In order to be able to make as much use as possible of what we know about similar situations in the real world, we try to synthesize a textual concept as near to our concept of reality as possible — we try to add the metaphorical information in such a way that its truth conflicts as little as possible with our conception of the real world. That is to

21) Some important constraints are in operation here: there should be an attribute which is important to the vehicle that cannot be applied to the tenor; and, the attribute located for matching must not be a trivial one.

22) *Apperception* was originally used by Herbart (1898) as a general term for those mental processes whereby an attended experience is brought into relation with an already acquired and familiar conceptual system. Here it is used as a superordinate term for 'encoding', 'mapping', 'categorizing', 'inference', 'assimilation and accommodation', 'attribution', etc. (Miller, 1979:203).

say, we try to make the world that the [speaker] is asking us to imagine resemble the real world (as we know it) in as many respects as possible.

[...] It is indeed true that an attempt to understand "Man is a wolf" causes a [hearer] to explore those respects in which men and wolves are similar, but to add "Man is like a wolf" to the textual concept violates the truth assumption that is a [hearer's] only basis for determining the author's state of mind. "Man is a wolf" is a much stronger claim, and if that is what the [speaker] said, [hearers] must assume that that is what the [speaker] meant.

[... W]hen a [speaker] says something literally false or contradictory, [hearers] do not translate it into something true and then assume that that was what the [speaker] meant to say. Rather, they assume that what the [speaker] said is true in the state of affairs he is describing, then search their general knowledge for plausible grounds for saying that in the given context. Their search for those grounds, however, is guided by whatever resemblances and analogies they can find between the world of the text and the world of reality.

(ibid. pp. 213-214)

In a formal representation of the metaphor analysis he uses the following, in which SIM represents the relation of similitude between two concepts. These are supposed to be conceptual notation necessary for understanding metaphors (ibid. pp.223-233).

- (11) a. SIM (x,y)
 "The brain is like a machine."
 SIM (the brain, a machine)

The notation of the underlying concept of (a) is a relation of two sentential concepts as in (b).

- b. SIM [F(the brain), G(the machine)]

The features shared by *brain* and *machine* constitute the grounds for expressed similitude. Now, since the functions F and G do not have to be explicitly expressed, they are bound by the existential quantifiers to result in (c).

- c. $SIM(x,y) \rightarrow (\exists F)(\exists G)\{SIM [F(x), G(y)]\}$ ²³⁾

23) M. Krifka (p.c) points out that this must be something like $(\exists F)(\exists G)\{SIM \langle \langle F,x \rangle, \langle G,y \rangle \rangle\}$, x and y are similar to each other with respect to F and G, because, otherwise F(x) and G(y) are just two prepositions, and it is unclear which type of similarity is intended.

Therefore, *the brain is like a machine* can be in the following representation:

$$d. \text{SIM (the brain, a machine)} \rightarrow (\exists F)(\exists G) \{ \text{SIM [F(the brain), G(a machine)]} \},$$

one interpretation of which can be:

$$e. \text{SIM [WORK(the brain), COMPUTE(a machine)]}$$

"The brain works the way a machine computes."

Similarly the analogy statements can be:

$$f. \text{SIM [(x:x'), (y:y')]} \rightarrow (\exists F)\{ \text{SIM [F (x,x'), (y,y')]} \}$$

Now, based on the above conceptual processes, metaphors are processed in the following way. Here, the distinction of three types of metaphors briefly discussed earlier is particularly efficient.

(12) Nominal metaphors

$$a. \text{BE}(x,y) \rightarrow (\exists F)(\exists G) \{ \text{SIM [F}(x), G(y)] \}$$

b. "The toes are fingers of the foot."

$$\text{BE (toes, fingers)} \rightarrow (\exists F)(\exists G)\{ \text{SIM [F(toes), G(fingers)]} \}$$

<Some property of the toes is like some property of the fingers.>

Now, H is the relation of the finger to the hand, and G is the function by abstraction from H(y,hand):

$$(13) \quad G = \lambda y. H(y, \text{hand})$$

$$F = \lambda y. H(y, \text{foot})$$

Therefore, the underlying analogy can be written:

$$(14) \quad \text{BE (toes, fingers)} \rightarrow$$

$$(\exists H)(\exists x)(\exists y) [\text{SIM } \{ [\lambda x. H(x, \text{foot})] (\text{toes}), [\lambda y. H(y, \text{hand})] (\text{fingers}) \}]$$

$$= (\exists H) \{ \text{SIM [H (toe, foot), H (finger, hand)]} \}^{24)}$$

The predicate metaphors are also processed in a similar way. For example, the previously

24) As M. Krifka (p.c.) points out, (14) contains a mistake from the viewpoint of formal logic, because in (14) 'H' is used as a variable, and it has been used previously in (13) as a constant. Therefore, the variable in (14) must be replaced by other symbol, like K, for example. Despite such a minor mistake, the argument Miller puts forth here seems clear.

given metaphorical statement *The rich perform leisure* can be shown as the following:

(15) a. Reconstruction:

PERFORM (the rich, leisure) →

$(\exists F)(\exists y, y') \{ \text{SIM} [F(\text{the rich, leisure}), \text{PERFORM} (y, y')] \}$

b. An interpretation:

PERFORM (the rich, leisure) →

SIM [ENJOY(the rich, leisure), PERFORM (the poor, duties)]

As elegant as it is, Miller's simile thesis is not immune to criticisms. Particularly, Searle (1979) sees many problems with it. He lists the five major problems that follow. First, this theory presupposes the existence of the object that makes the predicate literally true, which is counterfactual. Second, this theory confuses the metaphor's truth condition with the principles necessary for its understanding. Third, it fails to explain how to compute the values of the variables. Fourth, it is not always the case that a similarity underlies a metaphor. And fifth, in this analysis most semantic contents of metaphors have too many predicates. For example, a simple metaphor 'Man is a wolf' may be represented as $\text{SIM}_R(\text{man, wolf})$, in which case only one variable R (respect) is involved for computation; while, according to Miller's analysis, it would be in a form like:

(16) $\exists F \exists G \exists H \{ \text{SIM}_H [F(\text{man}), G(\text{wolf})] \}$,

which involves too many (three) variables, which is counter-intuitive.

Searle's criticisms, however, seem to fall short of invalidating the strength of Miller's thesis. For example, the criticism that the analysis mistakenly presupposes the existence of two objects, as we can say 'Sally is a dragon,' which does not literally entail $\exists x (x \text{ is a dragon})$, is not well-founded. The non-existence of 'dragon' in reality does not constitute the problem, because to the speaker, and to the hearer as presumed by the speaker, the 'dragon' does exist in psychological reality, which has defining properties determined either culturally or purely imaginatively. Also, Searle argues that similarity, upon which this whole analysis is based, may be relevant to production and understanding but not to meaning. However, it is hard to imagine that meaning can be separated from the production and understanding, considering that production is an act of encoding meaning and that understanding is an act of decoding it. Also, his argument that the involvement of too many variables in the analysis is counter-intuitive is not convincing. Of course, there may be no way of directly observing the language processing mechanism in human brains to investigate how many variables are actually involved in understanding a particular statement. However, indirect observations suggest that the mechanism is surely a very strong one, as is evidenced in its efficiency in appropriate disambiguation, which some researchers consider

comparable to a miracle. Furthermore, the claim resorting to 'intuition' is also mistaken by virtue of not fully considering what a formal logical representation is. The formal notation is not necessarily a representation of mental process, but rather a methodological artifact for the sake of clarity and ease of analysis.²⁵⁾ Considering this, involving three variables instead of one in the above example does not seem to be a weakness of the analysis.

Lakoff and Johnson also criticize the comparison theory as being inadequate. They claim that both the simple non-metaphorical sentences and metaphorical sentences are understood in the exactly same way, the only difference being that in the case of the former, the hearer uses same kind of experience; while in the case of the latter, he uses different kind of experience. However, if we take a close look at it, how those two kinds are associated is never clear. It is questionable if the association can be anything other than similitude.

3.3 Interaction theory

The origin of the interaction theory goes back to Richards (1936) who thought that a metaphor has terms that create tensions because of conceptual incompatibility.²⁶⁾ He claimed:

[... W]hen we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase whose meaning is a *result of interaction*. (p.93: emphasis mine)

In Fregean terms the interaction involved in this theory can be generalized as a relation between the senses and beliefs. More recently, this theory was espoused by Gräbe (1984) and Trick and Katz (1986). In the latter, the interaction is thought of as involving the domains of tenor and vehicle rather than the more isolated and restricted aspects of the two terms.²⁷⁾ They argue that the two distances, i.e., between-domain distance and within-domain distance, are of importance. Though it had earlier proponents, an excellent detailed explication of interaction theory is found in Black (1962). He counters then-prevalent substitution theory and comparison theory, which, according to him, view the metaphor as too unemphatic by considering it as a replacement of some set of literal sentences or a condensed simile whose literal paraphrase is a

25) The expressive power of formal notation is well exhibited in Kleene's (1967) example, in which he contrasted two expressions: $x^2 + 3x - 2 = 0$ and The square of the unknown, increased by three times the unknown, and diminished by two, is equal to zero. The clarity (disambiguation) can be seen in an ambiguous sentence Someone smiles and someone laughs, which can be given in two unambiguous forms $\exists x [S(x) \ \& \ L(x)]$ and $\exists x \exists y [S(x) \ \& \ L(y)]$.

26) For this reason, it is sometimes called 'the tensive view'.

27) This type of interaction theory is called domains interaction theory and was first proposed by Sternberg (1983).

statement of similarity or analogy. According to Black (1962: pp. 44-45; 1979: pp. 28 -29), the main claims in interaction theory can be summarized as follows:

- (17) a. a metaphorical statement has two subjects (primary and secondary);
- b. the secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing;
- c. the metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary subject a set of "assorted implications", comprised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject;
- d. the maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the members of the secondary subject's implicative complex; and
- e. in the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the following ways: (1) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; (2) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (3) reciprocally induces parallel changes in secondary subject.

Applying this to an example *Marriage is a zero-sum game*, the implication-complex may be (Black, 1979: p.29-30):

- (18) G1 A 'game' is a contest;
- G2 between two opponents;
- G3 in which one player can win only at the expense of other.

Now the imputed claim may be:

- (19) M1 A marriage is a sustained struggle;
- M2 between two contestants;
- M3 in which the rewards (power? money? satisfaction?) of one contestant are gained at the other's expense.

Searle (1979) criticizes interaction theory by saying that according to this theory, all metaphorical uses of expressions must occur in sentences containing literal use of expressions (to create interaction) which is not a necessary condition to be a metaphor, and that speaker's meaning (Searle's term for the intended meaning of the metaphor) does not come from interaction. Searle contends that the importance of context (for interaction) as claimed in this view is also valid for other literal statements.

However, even though Searle thusly criticizes interaction theory, he seems to allow for this in

his own analysis. According to his analysis, there are three basic steps the hearer takes for interpretation of a metaphorical statement of the form 'S is P' to mean 'S is R'.²⁸⁾ These are, first, detecting a defect in the literal interpretation; second, looking for the salient, well-known, distinctive features of P; and third, going back to S to restrict the applicable values from many candidates. This last step is truly interactional. Some of Searle's criticisms are discussed in Morgan (1979).

Despite the fact that such interactional process is used not only in metaphorical expressions but also in literal expressions, the process involved in the two cases seems to have a marked difference in terms of its range. For example, the interaction process for a literal expression *John is an engineer* and one for a metaphorical expression *John is a wolf* seem to have different ranges of interaction. In the former, the interaction between *John* and *engineer* is intra-categorical; while the one between *John* and *wolf* is inter-categorical. This inter-categorical interaction, as a matter of fact, is the main characteristic of metaphor. This issue of scope will be discussed again in Section 5.3.

IV. Metaphor and Culture

In Section 3, we briefly touched on the general considerations for a more comprehensive metaphor theory. There seems to be one more important point to be considered — culture. In this section we will review the issue of culture in the study of metaphor.

Language in general is a cultural artifact. For a language to properly function in a community, its culture must be always considered. The production and interpretation of language is best understood only through the understanding of its culture. Therefore, it is questionable if a language in a true sense can be analyzed to its fullest without such consideration. This issue is particularly acute in the study of metaphor.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claimed the importance of experience in the formation of a conceptual system, and argued that experience shows much cross-cultural variation, and that therefore, proper study of culture must be incorporated in the study of metaphor. However, their work lacks the discussion of culture.

Bonvillian (1993) lists many instances of metaphors that are directly rooted in the cultural characteristics, giving examples from the studies of Hoijer (1951), Witherspoon (1975), Bean

28) Searle seems to allow this because these are the steps involved in the interpretation not in the meaning. He apparently thinks that meaning can be independent of production and interpretation (understanding).

(1975), MacLaury (1989), among others. Likewise, Quinn (1991) argues that linguists and cognitive scientists have neglected the central role of culture in the construct of human thought. In response to Johnson's (1987) puzzle: "How can knowledge be the construct of individual minds, yet public and shared?", Quinn says that given that there is a vast amount of understanding that is relative to given cultures and not universal,²⁹⁾ such non-universal but culture-specific cases may be best explained by the cultural models.

As we briefly touched on earlier, Basso (1981) discusses Western Apache metaphors, known as 'wise words', and argues for the importance of cultural understanding in proper production and interpretation of their metaphors. Wise words are metaphors of the syntactic form A is B where B's behavioral attributes of undesirable qualities are A's connotative meanings. Based on this, he argues that the (then-)current linguistic approaches are incapable of specifying such special features of wise words. Dissatisfied with transformational linguistics for its disregard of context and figurative meanings, he urges that "anthropologists and linguists are in a position to construct theoretical models that can contribute in useful ways to a clearer understanding of the semantics of metaphor and the role of metaphor in cultural systems. (p. 245). He claims that it is in metaphor that language and culture come together and display their fundamental inseparability.

Mühlhäusler (1985) in discussing the study of metaphors in Tok Pisin³⁰⁾ and some vernaculars spoken in Melanesia, argues for the necessity of a distinction between the natural metaphors (developmentally caused metaphors) and nurtural metaphors (culturally invented metaphors). This seems to have relevance to Quinn's (1991) argument. Quinn, in a discussion of her experiment with twenty-two husbands and wives, claim that metaphors, far from being productive of understanding *de novo* (*contra* Lakoff and Johnson), are actually highly constrained by understanding and are chosen to fit the cultural model which is culturally shared. In other words, metaphors are constrained by the culture.

Another interesting observation is found in Gossen (1974). In a study of the Chamulas, Gossen illustrates the function of the metaphor of heat as a basic canon of almost all speech performances. This metaphor, rooted in religion and cosmology in connection with the primacy of the sun, is fundamental in their linguistic activities. This is an excellent example of the intensity of the pervasiveness of metaphor in language.

From the above arguments and from numerous other observations, it is evident that there are

29) Universally shared understandings, according to Johnson, are from our common human experience of ourselves in the world.

30) These metaphors include tok *piksa* (picture talk) and tok *pilai* (play talk).

metaphors that have particularly strong cultural connections. And truly, there seem to be metaphors that are cross-linguistically universal, and ones that are culture-specifically universal. Since the general usage of metaphor is a linguistic activity, metaphor has a claim to be a part of a complete and competent linguistic theory. It is not certain — rather, it is doubtful — if a cogent treatment of metaphor can be achieved in semantics — as defined as the study of truth-conditional aspects of meaning of language. However, even though the onus is very heavy because a proper treatment of metaphor concerns not only grammaticality but also cultural appropriateness, as Hymes (1973, etc.) suggested, it does not seem to be unrealizable in pragmatics, and as a matter of fact, the alternative analysis proposed here is just such a one.

V. Toward an Alternative Analysis

In this section, we will recapitulate the observations made in the foregoing discussion, and based on that, will discuss the two main components of an alternative analysis proposed here: recognition and interpretation of metaphor.

5.1 Some essential considerations for a theory of metaphor

From the preceding review, one thing that is evident is that each theory has a unique merit and at the same time has some disadvantages relative to the others. The substitution theory, for example, can best account for the freezing phenomenon of metaphors that eventually lose their metaphorical meaning: many such metaphors may be from catachresis.³¹⁾ Since there are truly innumerable such instances in the language, and the aging process is on-going, this theory must be duly credited. Likewise, this has some empirical support, because when a speaker of a metaphor is asked what it means, the most likely self-interpretation is in a form of substitution. However, it has a problem in the depreciation of the significance of metaphor, as is often claimed by many students of metaphor.

The comparison theory, on the other hand, satisfies the intuition that metaphors are closely associated with similitude statements. Because of this intuition, a claim that metaphor is not (or may not be) based on similitude does not seem convincing (at least at first). (That Miller's apperception-based comparison theory can formally present such similitude — whether or not it has a matching lexeme in the language ³²⁾ — adds to the merit of the theory.) However, even

31) Even though many metaphorical expressions, which were not lexical gap fillers, may become trite ones through repeated usage, the process of becoming 'dead' metaphors should be considerably faster in cases of catachresis for the lack of options.

32) Even though some critics argue against this theory based on the fact that sometimes there is no such

though comparison is process involved, it is true that a metaphor cannot be equated to a similitude. In other words, similitude plays a role, but similitude itself is not a metaphor.

The interaction theory has the merit of explaining how the appropriate meaning selection is negotiated in a given context. In other words, a particular interpretation is selected from many possible interpretations, and this selectional process seems only possible through the consideration of tenor and vehicle at the same time — choosing a candidate meaning from the senses of the vehicle and evaluating the appropriateness by consideration of tenor. In addition, conceding that interaction is important in metaphor, interaction is still a process or a strategy, and cannot be equated with the metaphor.

Previously we also reviewed the importance of culture in a theory of metaphor. Based on those observations we will sketch a more comprehensive approach to metaphor by integrating all of the approaches introduced above.

5.2 Homage to Metaphor

The metaphor may be chosen for various reasons — for lack of proper lexeme for the concept the utterer intends to express (linguistic reasons), for amplification of the imagery effect (aesthetic reasons), for avoidance of direct statement (appropriateness reasons), etc. Therefore, it must not be thought of as a mere embellishment in lieu of a literal expression. It can be used as such, but that is not the essence of metaphor. Condemning metaphor as a linguistic deviance cannot be justified because in so doing one fails to recognize that while metaphors violate certain rules, the violations are systematic and never random. This is how metaphor maintains its status as a genre in language use — not allowing itself to be identical with linguistic mistakes or logically erratic sentences such as *The quadruplicity wets procrastination, or Mary is two plus six, or Two plus six is five*. These two groups are qualitatively different. Metaphorically speaking, a familiar idea is applied to an apparently incompatible idea. It resists at first, but eventually gives in in metaphor; it does not give in in erratic sentences.

5.3 Recognition and Scope of Metaphor

As mentioned earlier, despite the difficulties in defining metaphor, the recognition of metaphoricality of a given sentence is relatively straightforward. In this section, we will first review to what extent scope is relevant and we will attempt to exhaustively list the ways in which metaphor is signaled and perceived.

matching lexeme, it does not constitute a legitimate criticism, because it is a conceptual notation, not a linguistic notation, and therefore, it may not be realized lexically.

5.3.1 Scope: Preliminary Issue to Recognition

Before we get to the issue of metaphor recognition, the issue of scope must be considered first. This is because the issue of recognition has been complicated by the prevalent practice by most (if not all) students of metaphor of restricting data to sentential metaphors. The sentence is not, however, the only level where the recognition of metaphoricity is allowed, as we can see in the following.

- (20) a. cold eyes b. sea of people
 c. kill time d. The sea roared.
 e. John is our preacher. I am tired of his everyday sermons in his math classes.

Furthermore, there are cases when such recognition is made possible only at the end of a long story-telling or text, or sometimes it is well after a discourse, or worse yet, some recognitions are never made (for some people). Texts of esoteric character may cause such difficulties in recognition. From this, one thing becomes obvious — the signal that invokes a metaphorical interpretation is not necessarily syntactic³³⁾ or semantic, or even a speech act (since in speech act theory, the failure of literal interpretability is considered a necessary condition). I consider that this is the central reason why semantic theories of metaphor fail to provide felicitous answers to the problems of metaphor. If I am to digress a little, semantic theories rely on a semantic feature addition/cancellation process to deal with the mismatch. Since the semantic features are usually limited to the denotative features, and what are involved in metaphor are connotative features, such semantic theories are bound to fail.³⁴⁾ Therefore, an appropriate device must be able to deal with much larger scope than those designed to deal only with lexical, phrasal and/or the common sentence level. I believe that there exists one such device — Gricean theory. We will return to this discussion in the following section.

5.3.2 Recognition

Now that it is established that the recognition of metaphor cannot always occur within the sentence level, I will show how metaphoricity might be signalled. Here, I will enumerate five classes of metaphor signals and will show how Gricean maxims can efficiently handle all such cases comprehensively.

33) For a possible exception see footnote 43.

34) As a matter of fact, there are some expanded versions of semantic approaches that include connotative features in the features for cancellation and addition. However, such approaches still fail when encountering tautological metaphors, as well as the metaphors of self-contradiction such as the negations of tautological metaphors. Generally speaking, I believe that the feature cancellation/addition approach is inferior.

Explicit Linguistic Signals. Some metaphorical utterances explicitly signal their metaphoricity by using hedge-words like 'metaphorically (speaking)', 'in a sense', etc. as in:

- (21) Metaphorically (speaking), man is a wolf.

By hearing this hedge-word, the hearer can activate the metaphorical interpretation mechanism immediately, instead of futilely searching for an appropriate literal interpretation which is doomed to fail. Such hedge-words are very interesting and may have some linguistic implication. According to speech act theory, there exist so-called speech-act adverbials. Let us consider the contrast in the following example:

- (22) a. Unfortunately, the hero was killed in the war.
 b. It is unfortunate that the hero was killed in the war.
- (23) a. Frankly, my date was uninteresting.
 b. * It is frank that my date was uninteresting.
 c. I frankly state to you that my date was uninteresting.

Unlike sentential modifying adverbials, e.g., unfortunately, the adverbials like frankly do not modify anything related to the usual meaning of a clause of a sentence but the speech act itself. Interestingly, the metaphorical hedges behave in a similar way.

- (24) a. Metaphorically, man is a wolf.
 b. * It is metaphorical that man is a wolf.
 c. I state metaphorically to you that man is a wolf.

Since *man is a wolf* is a literally false sentence which is made felicitous by the hedge-word that modifies the performative, this might indicate that the assertion of metaphoricity truly lies in the speech acts rather than entirely in the isolated meaning of the clause/sentence.

Violation of Selectional Restrictions. Putting aside such obvious cases as those signalled by hedge-words, how we recognize a metaphor is a big issue. Traditionally, it has been proposed that some deviation or violation of rules must be noticed first. For example, the violation of selectional restriction or sortal mismatch is perceived by the hearer in the following examples.

- (25) a. John is a bear.
 b. The ship ploughs the sea.

In (25.a), as long as interpreting 'John' as the name of a bear (e.g., kept as a pet) is not warranted, the hearer can immediately determine that selectional restrictions are violated.

Likewise, needless to say, in (25.b) unless 'plough' is polysemous having at least one meaning denoting certain applicable features in the ship's motion in the sea, the violation can be easily noticed.

Tautology. Even though the cases involving hedge-words and selectional restrictions encompass the majority of metaphors, there are still other classes of metaphor. One such class is the metaphor of tautology statements. Let us consider the following example.

- (26) a. Well, boys are boys! (They are expected to make trouble.)
 b. Communists are communists. (They deserve hatred(?).)
 c. Politicians are politicians. (You shouldn't believe them.)

Generally speaking, tautological statements receive metaphorical interpretation. Why are they not considered as simple tautological statements but metaphorical statements? I will argue that the simple reason has to do with the very way we partake of this linguistic activity: we do not like meaningless sentences. This follows from the Gricean maxims in a straightforward way.

However, there is another interesting puzzle: why the same interpretation does not apply to sentences of identical structures, i.e., tautology statements as in (27)?

- (27) a. ? Buildings are buildings.
 b. ? One plus one is one plus one.

I will argue that the critical difference between (26) and (27) is that (27) lacks stereotypical features in the vehicle. We will return to this issue in Section 5.4.

Contradiction. Another class of metaphor is signalled in contradictory statements. Syntactically these are simple negations of the tautology statements. Let us consider the following examples.

- (28) a. Well, boys are not always boys! (They may be nice sometimes.)
 b. Communists are not always communists. (Some of them are nice.)
 c. Politicians are not always politicians. (Some of them are reliable.)

Still another type of metaphor whose metaphoricality is signalled by contradiction is the cases where the contradiction is seen inter-sententially, i.e., contextually, unlike the above cases in which contradiction is observed within a sentence. Let us consider the following example.

- (29) John is a preacher. I am tired of his everyday sermons in his math lectures.

In the above example, our knowledge of the world renders the literal interpretation of the first sentence not optimal, simply because our epistemic judgment is that a religious preacher normally does not give math lectures everyday, even though that is not totally impossible.

This class is exactly parallel to the tautology class. Why such self-contradictory statements signal metaphoricity can be easily explained by means of Grice's conversational maxims and Putnam's stereotypes.

Special Forms. Special forms of utterances, or genres such as poems, parables, or puns, can also signal metaphoricity. The relevance of recognition of the form of material and the metaphorical interpretation also applies to non-linguistic material such as visual arts, artistic paintings, some visual commercials, etc., even though these do not concern us here. In the case of poetry, cues can be also visual — such as the sentences arranged in stanzas, line-initial capitalization, etc. — and in verbal forms, tones, intonation patterns, etc. that are characteristic of poetry recitation. But the recognition of its being a poem, and thus the readiness for metaphorical interpretation, is most likely signalled by violations of selectional restrictions, patently used by poetry. All such cues are present in the following example.

- (30) Love bade me welcome; yet my soul drew back,
 Guilty of dust and sin.
 But quick-eyed Love, observing me grow slack
 From my first entrance in,
 Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning
 If I lacked anything.

from *Love* by George Herbert (1593-1633)

There are poems, however, in which selectional restrictions are not present. In such cases, if the poem does not provide visual keys either, then the matter becomes different. Let us consider the following Korean poem.

- (31) Till the very day of my death, looking up at the sky,
 Lest there be any shame - not even a speck:
 Even by the breezes rustling the leaves
 I was troubled.
 With a heart that I sing to the stars with,
 I will love all that are destined to die.
 Then I will walk
 The way that is given to me.
 Again tonight the star is grazed by the wind.

This poem, short as it is, is truly filled with metaphors, despite the fact that apparently the sentences are also plainly interpretable literally. Only through the understanding of the author, and the historical background of this poem can we understand fully what it is about. Then, most terms used here, such as 'sky', 'breeze', 'rustling', 'love', 'all that are destined to die', 'way', 'star', 'walk', 'wind', etc. are understood to have been used in fact as vehicles for other ideas.

5.3.3 Gricean Maxims

In the foregoing discussion, I have shown that the cues enabling a hearer to interpret metaphorically are given in seemingly diverse ways. The signal most frequently resorted to — the violation of selectional restrictions — is not sufficient to explain many cases; in other words, the problem with the claim of violation of selectional restrictions is not that it is wrong but that it does not apply to all cases. In short, there are cases that the cue exists textually or contextually, the latter encompassing such features as are culturally and linguistically relevant to the production and interpretation of utterances. Needing background knowledge, as seen in some poetry, is a case of cues from contextual information³⁶⁾. Now, it seems in order to present a device that can effectively deal with both textual and contextual factors — Gricean maxims.

Since its first introduction in 1967 and its exposition in Grice (1975, 1978), the general "co-operative principle" with the maxims of conversation has been a great contribution to pragmatics.³⁷⁾ The main claims can be summarized in the general principle of co-operation (32) and the four maxims of conversation given in (33) - (36). (Quoted from Levinson, 1983: 101-102.)

(32) The co-operative principle

Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

(33) The maxim of Quality

Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:

35) The poet lived in the darkest period of Korean history, i.e., the Japanese colonial times (1910-1945). His poems, numbering about 120, are mostly about the agony by which most intellectuals were torn, between the ideal and expected role model of showing national leadership in a dark age and the grim oppressive reality that prevents it. Sadly enough, the poet died in prison only days before the emancipation.

36) The contextually given cues are also seen in examples such as "John is a preacher" if we know that John's profession is not so. Generally speaking, invoking our general knowledge is very frequently required in triggering metaphorical interpretations.

37) A detailed exposition and discussion is found in much literature; Levinson (1983) Chapter 3 is an excellent reference.

- (i) Do not say what you believe to be false.
- (ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- (34) The maxim of Quantity
 - (i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purpose of the exchange.
 - (ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- (35) The maxim of Relevance
 - Make your contributions relevant.
- (36) The maxim of Manner
 - Be perspicuous, and specifically:
 - (i) Avoid obscurity.
 - (ii) Avoid ambiguity.
 - (iii) Be brief.
 - (iv) Be orderly.

These are the maxims observed by the participants for a maximally efficient, rational, and co-operative engagement in conversation. Therefore, in cases of metaphor whose metaphoricity is signalled by explicit hedge-words, the hearer is simply co-operating with the speaker who says that the given (to be given) statement must be metaphorically construed. It is a case of a very trivial application of the Gricean maxims.

Of course, those maxims above are not always observed strictly. The speaker may flagrantly flout such maxims, in which case implicatures arise. The hearer's recognition that a maxim or maxims have been seemingly flouted enables him to look for non-literal interpretations. Therefore, in metaphorical statements where selectional restrictions are violated, such recognition is easily achieved. In such cases, e.g., *John is a wolf*, the hearer knows that the maxim of quality has been violated simply because, otherwise, the speaker would not have said such a plainly false statement, and the hearer thinks that according to the co-operative principle the speaker has tried to make a rational assertion that contributes to the conversation. And, thus, the hearer starts his search for a meaningful alternative.

In cases where no selectional restrictions are violated, the maxim of relevance is usually applicable. For example, when the speaker uses a tautology statement or a contradictory statement, the hearer notices that the speaker is apparently not observing the conversational maxims (otherwise, the utterance would be construed literally). This triggers the hearer's search for an acceptable, alternate interpretation, assuming that what the speaker says must be a rational statement and must be one that contributes to the interaction. Therefore, the apparent violation of relevance in case of tautology and that of quality in case of contradiction are resolved by finding a meaningful alternative, i.e., a metaphorical interpretation.

For a large text where the entire content is metaphorical, for example, the well-known sower's parable of Jesus (Matthew 13:3-9), in which Jesus talks about a sower who sowed seeds, some of which landed on the street, some in the bush, some among pebbles, and some in good soil, the hearers, most likely only after a considerable length of the parable has been said, may become aware that the story of a farmer sowing seeds is not following the maxim of relevance, because situationally such an agricultural anecdote is not relevant to the crowd's expectation of some Messianic message. Again, the resolution is reached by using the Gricean maxims. As evidenced, the form carries a certain burden here, just as with poems, jokes that are not meant to be true, etc. All these diverse forms of metaphor can be handled with the Gricean maxims.

Employing the Gricean maxims for explanations of metaphoric interpretation has very significant consequences. First of all, now we can explain the phenomenon that when hearing an utterance or reading a text, we make use of a high level of flexibility in understanding. In other words, it can explain why we do not turn off our reception channel when we hear such utterances as *The bear asked the tiger to marry her*, or *The mermaid fell in love with the prince*, and numerous others that are literally false or infelicitous. However, we keep on reading or listening, having no difficulties in understanding them despite their falsity or infelicitousness. We do so because in a sense we have faith in the speaker/writer. We believe that he is giving us some relevant information (the maxim of relevance) and that more generally he is trying to make some contribution in this linguistically-based interaction (the co-operative principle).

There is a more important consequence of employing the Gricean maxims. The scope of mechanism has been enlarged from lexical, phrasal, and sentential level to the discourse level, where all contextual information and the participant's world knowledge are made accessible. I will argue for this importance, which, I hope, gives some justification for employing the Gricean maxims in metaphor analysis.

Semantic theories have inherent disadvantages in dealing with metaphor because the semantic features are denotative, while the features involved in metaphor are largely connotative. Let us consider the following examples.³⁸⁾

(37) John is a lion.

(38) a. John is brave, strong, prestigious, dominates others,

b. lion: a large flesh-eating chiefly nocturnal cat (*Felis leo*) that lives and hunts in groups on the plains or rocky areas of Africa and formerly southern Asia, and that has a tawny body with a tufted tail and in the male a shaggy blackish or dark brown mane

38) This dictionary definition is from *Longman Dictionary of the English Language*, 1984.

- (39) Pigs are not always pigs.
- (40) a. Pigs (the animals we are familiar with) are not always dirty and offensive,
 b. pig: any of various short-legged and typically stout-bodied mammals (family Suidae) with a thick bristly skin and a long mobile snout; especially a domesticated pig belonging to the same species (*Sus scrofa*) as the European wild boar.

What is being shown by the contrast between (a)s and (b)s is very obvious — the metaphorically used terms mostly (or entirely) convey only the connotative features; it is striking that it is hard to find shared properties between (a) and (b). That is why such seemingly self-contradictory sentences as (39) are not problematic at all in metaphor. This issue of connotative features will be discussed in further detail in the following section.

Another advantageous consequence of having the extended scope by adopting the Gricean maxims can be seen in the following. For production of metaphor, we have argued that similitude and comparison play a basic role. There is one apparent problem with such a position — that speakers can sometimes explicitly reject the similarity statement in favor of strict metaphor. For example, one can say, for the purpose of emphasis, *She is not like an angel, she IS an angel*, in which case both the substitution statement and the conceptual notation run into difficulties, because this statement explicitly denies the simple similitude, on which both the substitution theory and comparison theory are based. Such an example is a case of hyperbole as a result of pushing the alleged similarity of the two terms to the extreme by equating them. However, this does not pose a problem for the Gricean maxims, because this kind of flouting is rather based on the knowledge that 'A is B' metaphors are normally produced and construed as 'A is like B' statements. Therefore, it supports the similitude interpretation of metaphor. In the Gricean point of view, the hearer's interpretation works under the presumption that the speaker is co-operative and trying to make a contribution that is true. Therefore, the hearer may undergo these steps of reasoning: since *She is an angel* means *She is like an angel*, the speaker's statement *She is not like an angel; she IS an angel*³⁹⁾ is self-contradictory in a normal interpretation; since the speaker must be co-operative, such a self-contradictory statement cannot be what he really means; since the difference between the two propositions syntactically is the 'similitude' and 'equation', the statement must be construed as a case of hyperbole through equation. This mechanism is similar to scalar implicatures, i.e., the speaker makes the strongest statement. For example, if the speaker knows that A has seven sons, he would not say that A has five sons, even though it is logically true that a person who has seven sons also has five sons. Following this scalar implicature, the speaker would say the strongest version of what he intends to say, and the hearer, accordingly, interprets it as such, based on the assumption that the speaker would abide by that. Of course, this is also well explained by the Gricean maxims. As a matter of fact, such unusual cases like the

39) This is an instance of 'metalinguistic negation' as discussed in Horn (1985).

example given above are usually signalled by a stress on *is*.

Still another merit of employing the Gricean maxims to broaden scope is that it addresses not only the strategy of dealing with flagrant violations involving truth-falsity but also the subtle violations involving appropriateness-inappropriateness. This is a very significant point, because, if the code-switching of interpretations between the literal and the non-literal is triggered by some obvious violation, then some subtle cases can (might) not be properly treated. For example, if the hearer always starts with the literal interpretation as a default, and when it violates certain rules, he looks for a non-literal meaning of the statement⁴⁰, then problems emerge in the case of puns. This is so because puns are intended to have *both interpretations at the same time*; and, therefore, since the literal meaning does not violate one of those maxims, the hearer is not supposed to look for a non-literal meaning, but of course must do so to find the pun. Therefore, we should consider that the general co-operative principle must be concerned with a broader range of co-operation which would include the appropriateness issue. This seems empirically true, because the hearer seems to use a wide-range probe in the search for a 'maximally appropriate' version of interpretation. In the case of puns, the hearer finds two equally appropriate versions of interpretation from two different domains, which, rare as it is, arouses a feeling of appreciation for the skillful management of language. Other empirical support from speech perception is that the hearer usually does not pick up only one interpretation of an utterance, but instead, forms a flexible model that is compatible with many possible interpretations, purging some subset of them as the cues (e.g., more sentences) are accumulated and incompatibility becomes obvious.

In sum, the strength of the Gricean maxims is that it can explain how our language as a communication system is operated to ensure the meaningfulness in the transaction. For that reason, the metaphorical statements are never thrown away as a meaningless linguistic garbage since the maxims are in surveillance, ready to search for the optimal alternative, as M. Krifka (p.c.) puts it nicely, 'whenever an utterance is in danger of being irrelevant'. "Irrelevance" should be understood not only in terms of truth-falsity but also in terms of appropriateness-inappropriateness.

5.4 Interpretation

More studies are given to the interpretation of metaphor than to its production, which is understandable because in reality researchers start with the metaphorical sentences as data and proceed to an attempt of the resolution of meaning, rather than investigating in retrospect how such metaphorical sentences are produced. Since there are no *a priori* reasons that prevent the

40) As a matter of fact this is the case not only with most pragmatic/speech act-based approaches but also certain versions of approaches using Gricean maxims.

assumption that the considerations involved in interpretation are the very considerations involved in production, proper understanding of interpretation can be assumed to contribute significantly to the understanding of production. In this section, we will review comparison and similitude, interaction, and stereotype as essential components of interpretation.

5.4.1 Comparison and Similitude

As briefly mentioned above, any theory that refutes the use of similitude in production and interpretation of metaphor fails to satisfy the intuition of users of metaphor. If the users do not compare the two terms, and if there indeed does not exist any similitude, culturally determined or otherwise, it is hardly conceivable how the selection of the term of vehicle can be made, and how such selection can be conceptually justified. Such theories can explain neither 'how' nor 'why'. Based on this I hypothesize that, in production of metaphor, the speaker relies on the similitude between what he wants to say (utterance) and what he wants to convey (intention). And the resolution of similitude is based on comparison of the two terms involved. Since there are cases of catachresis — when the metaphor is chosen as a lexical innovation because there is no lexeme — the tenor may not have a lexeme having the matching literal denotation. In this respect, Miller's analysis introduced in Section 3.2.5 definitely has merit. So, we will discuss this analysis in further detail.

Miller's analysis is elegant in that it tries to represent what a metaphorical interpretation in comparison theory is like by using formal notations. Despite the obvious merits, there are some weaknesses in his treatment. First of all, if a metaphor is a comparison of certain properties, and thus can be rendered into a similitude statement, then the comparison may be better represented as a similitude of two properties, instead of one of two sentential concepts as given in (41). Its better representation for (40) may be (42).

$$(41) \quad BE(x,y) \rightarrow (\exists F)(\exists G) \{SIM [F(x), G(y)]\}$$

$$(42) \quad BE(x,y) \rightarrow (\exists F)(\exists G) \{F(x) \wedge G(y) \wedge SIM (F, G)\}$$

However, despite its notational improvement, this is not very revealing because the burden of understanding a statement $BE(x,y)$ is not at all reduced in understanding $(\exists F)(\exists G) \{F(\text{man}) \wedge G(\text{wolf}) \wedge SIM (F, G)\}$.

Another weakness in Miller's analysis concerns specificity. Let us consider the following example.

$$(43) \quad \text{Man is a wolf.}$$

This nominal metaphor according to his analysis will be in the following expression (using the

improved notation given above).

$$(44) \text{ BE (man, a wolf) } \rightarrow \exists F \exists G \{F(\text{man}) \wedge G(\text{wolf}) \wedge \text{SIM}(F, G)\},$$

meaning that some property of man is like some property of a wolf. This representation is too general in that it renders the formula felicitous even by variables having very trivial properties in common. If 'man' and 'wolf' have the following similar properties;

- | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| (45) ⁴¹⁾ man: | a. [is animate], | b. [has four limbs], |
| | c. [is largely egoistic/greedy], | d. [aggressive], |
| wolf: | a. [is animate], | b. [has four limbs], |
| | c. [is largely egoistic/greedy], | d. [aggressive], |

the expression (43) is not intended to mean that 'man' and 'wolf' have properties like (a), or (b) in (45). The property (c) or (d), among others, is most likely what was intended. Therefore, to retain the meaningfulness of the metaphor, the marking of such intention seems to be an improvement and is done by specifying the respect (R) in the representation as in (46).

$$(46) \quad [[\text{Man is a wolf.}]] \rightarrow \exists F \exists G \exists R [F(\text{man}) \wedge G(\text{wolf}) \wedge \text{SIM}_R(F, G)].^{42)}$$

However, my objection to such notation is more fundamental for the following reason. The example sentence *Man is a wolf*, given above is a statement about 'man'; and it is not so much about 'wolf'. One may argue that it is also about 'wolf', but it may be so only in a very indirect way. In this sense, this metaphorical statement is an assertion about 'man'. That is to say, 'man' is the topic and 'is a wolf' is a comment. However, notations of Miller's idea can be as in (47) according to Miller's original version, or (48) following the newly suggested formula.

$$(47) \quad \exists F \exists G \{ \text{SIM} [F(\text{man}), G(\text{wolf})] \}$$

$$(48) \quad \exists F \exists G \exists R \{ F(\text{man}) \wedge G(\text{wolf}) \wedge \text{SIM}_R(F, G) \}$$

Both (47) and (48) can be understood as a statement that there exist such and such properties. In other words, using the examples of listing possible properties in (45), the two notations (47) and (48) can be construed as saying:

41) The listing of features here is rather arbitrary and based more on the folk stereotypes than on the dictionary definitions. More appropriate listings are used in the discussion in Section 5.3.3 above. However, this difference does not affect the validity of the argument here.

42) Searle (1979) made similar points on the necessity of specifying the respect on this.

- (49) There exists a shared/similar property, e.g., greediness, between man and a wolf. The original statement may be more like:
 (50) Man has a certain property, e.g., greediness, for which a wolf is an example *par excellence*.

In (49) the main idea is only the shared property; while in (50) it is 'man's having the property'. There is an asymmetry⁴³⁾ between the two terms because even though 'man' and 'wolf' may have a shared property, *Man is a wolf* and *A wolf is man* are radically different. As for asymmetry note that the vehicle may be not an entity but a predicate as in *He is boiling*. Such asymmetry cannot be captured in Miller's approach.⁴⁴⁾

The importance of the notion topichood in metaphor can be further shown in the following. In metaphors having a syntactic form of 'A is B', the topichood is relatively straightforward, 'A' being topic and 'B' being vehicle. However, since metaphors do not have to be in such syntactic structure, there can be many other forms as shown in the discussion in Section 1.2.3. In these constructions the status of the two terms with regard to the topichood is not fixed.⁴⁵⁾ For example an expression *the lion king* can be either 'a king who acts like a lion, e.g., courageous, strong, etc.' (when 'king' is the topic), or 'a lion which acts like a king in its habitat, e.g., most powerful, etc. (when 'lion' is the topic). This type of dual-interpretability is found not only in such compound noun forms of metaphor but also in almost any construction. Let us consider the

- 43) There is one interesting puzzle about this asymmetry. Sherzer (1990), in his study of Kuna Indians' metaphor, reports an interesting case which may be an exception to this syntactic-semantic asymmetry. "When the Kuna use A metaphorically to represent B, it is just as true that B represents A." (p.76). Another interesting puzzle is the report of Western Apache 'wise-words' by Basso, introduced in Section 4. Examples such as *Butterflies are girls*, or *Carrion beetle is a white-man* seem to be in syntactic structure of B is A. Since literal sentences are of A is B construction (*Destchiin ji ichohée* = All destchiin (a clan name) are liars), it is not clear if this is a metaphor's genre-specific construction. If so, it can be said that in case of Western Apache, metaphor is syntactically signalled.
 44) This problem is not metaphor-specific, because other literal sentences like *John is a student* is different from *A student is John*. Generally speaking, this type of logical notations of the modified standard predicate calculus cannot efficiently represent the topichood and asymmetry as in (1)

$$(1) \exists x [B(x) \ \& \ R(j,x)]$$

- a. John read a book, b. There is a book that John read, c. A book was read by John,
 d. It is a book that John read, e. It is John who read a book,

The differences can be captured only at the level that reflects the context in which they appear.

- 45) The fact that the topichood must be considered is an important claim in that it amounts to saying that the information available only in the linguistic expression itself, i.e., sentences or utterances, is not sufficient, and, therefore, it calls for considering contextual information as well. This point is further discussed in the subsequent sections.

following examples:

- (51) a. merry stream (humanlike stream vs. streamlike human)
 b. God, the Father (Godlike father vs. fatherlike God)
 c. the ship of a nation (shiplike nation vs. nationlike ship)
 d. The sun smiled. (sunlike human vs humanlike sun)

If we are to adhere to Miller's basic idea of using logical forms to represent metaphorical meaning, and to recognize the importance of topichood in metaphor, the following notations would be used. The main innovation is an adoption of the notion of 'inference' (Ξ).⁴⁶ The meaning of a metaphor is not construed as picking a certain property from the term A and another property from the term B and comparing the two. Rather, 'being B' in a metaphorical sentence licenses the inference of a certain property G. From Y, i.e., a certain property of 'being B', a certain property G is inferred. In other words, Y is vehicle and G is tenor. This can be represented as the following.

- (52) $\lambda Y \lambda x \exists G [Y \Xi G \wedge G(x)]$ ⁴⁷
 x is of type <e> Y is of type <e,t>
 (52) is of type <<e,t>, <e,t>>

If we apply *Man is a wolf* to the above formula, it will be as in (53).

- (53) $[\lambda Y \lambda x \exists G [Y \Xi G \wedge G(x)]]$ (is-a-wolf)(man)
 $[\lambda x \exists G [\text{is-a-wolf} \Xi G \wedge G(x)]]$ (man)
 $\exists G [\text{is-a-wolf} \Xi G \wedge G(\text{man})]$

There is important merit in this new formula; It captures the asymmetry between 'man' and 'a wolf'. In this new representation, the vehicle acts more like a background from which some relevant properties are highlighted and attributed to the topic, which is intuitively more agreeable than the idea of a one-to-one comparison of the two terms. This is in harmony with the interactionists' claim that the vehicle must be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing. In most cases of metaphor using a long text, such asymmetry is very obvious. For example, the metaphorical chanting reported in Sherzer (1990) shows that vehicles in many cases are an

46) As will be seen in the discussion in the next section, the inferences used in metaphor are stereotypical ones. For this reason, I will restrict the notion of 'inference' here to 'stereotypical inference'.

47) For the sake of restrictiveness, this formula can be further specified by adding $\wedge \text{RELEVANT}(G, x)$, which constrains that the newly inferred property is a "relevant" or "meaningful" one. Then (51) will be: $\lambda Y \lambda x \exists G [[Y \Xi G \wedge G(x)] \wedge \text{RELEVANT}(G, x)]$.

enumerated listing of things used collectively as a vehicle for a single concept. As a matter of fact, the underlying idea of this notation is closer to the idea assumed by the proponents of the substitution thesis. As we have reviewed previously, in the substitution thesis, the term vehicle simply disappears and is replaced by the literal paraphrase carrying the same or sufficiently similar idea of the vehicle. This is its main difference with the comparison theory, in which the vehicle survives and in a sense assumes a status parallel to that of the topic (=tenor). Since the idea of this new formula resembles that of substitution thesis, the argument often targeted at the substitution theory may arise here as well — the paraphrase using a listing of relevant properties may not be complete, and, therefore, however long the enumeration may be, there will always be something left out. One serious mistake is that such criticism fails to recognize that there are few, or no — in a stricter sense — paraphrases that do not leave out any possible relevant points. This is true even in a very simple literal sentence. In this sense, each and every utterance is unique. Let us consider a very simple example.

- (54) a. I love the woman.
 b. I have deep, tender feelings for the woman.
 c. I am passionately and tenderly devoted to her.

Is the meaning of the original sentence (54a) equivalent to (54b) and (54c)? To me (b) and (c) have a lot more left out the meaning in (a). This is not an abstract philosophical problem but a very practical one, anyone who tries to paraphrase any utterance will encounter it. This problem is not at all unique to metaphors.⁴⁸⁾

5.4.2. Interaction

In interpretation of metaphor (more than in its production), as I briefly indicated earlier, interaction plays an important role. Interaction seems to be not only the general strategy of locating the candidate properties intended by the speaker, but also a censor for determining their appropriateness as a qualified candidate. The best way of testing whether there exists interaction between the two terms may be testing whether the commonly accepted interpretation is available through a process blind to the existence of the other term. One interesting phenomenon is reported in Sapir (1977:7), an observation credited to Seitel in his study of the Haya of Tanzania.⁴⁹⁾ Let us consider the following.

48) The strongest version of this 'uniqueness' claim will lead to the rejection of the substitution thesis. However, I believe that despite such difficulties in paraphrasing we are content with many paraphrases without much frustrating meaning loss.

49) The example is not used for the same argument as mine. But, given the validity of the observation, it serves as evidence for my claim.

- (55) a. He is an eel.
b. He has devious qualities of slipperiness and stealth in social interaction.
- (56) a. She is an eel.
b. She has very smooth skin.

When the term 'eel' serves as the vehicle of a masculine tenor, its properties are more conceptual ones; while if it is for a feminine tenor, they are more sensual (visual and tactile) ones. It is evident that without considering the properties of the tenor (in this case the gender), proper interpretation is not available. Such examples are truly abundant. Let us consider the following examples.

- (57) a. Texas Highway 290 is a snake.
b. The highway has many curves and is winding.
- (58) a. John is a snake.
b. He is wicked, elusive, treacherous, can hurt others,

The decisive factor in the above examples is the animacy of the tenor. It is obvious that if the interpretations are made in the opposite way such as 'The highway is wicked, elusive, treacherous, can hurt others...' and 'John has many curves, and is winding,...', those properties cannot be attributed to the topic (tenor). Insomuch as this is clear, so it is with the point that I want to address: blind interpretation of the vehicle cannot be done without considering the tenor. In determining what kind of properties of the vehicle must be picked up, the tenor must be considered, and *vice versa*.

5.4.3. Stereotype

From the discussion in Section 5.3.1, we established that the aspects to be considered in a proper understanding of metaphor include not only textual but also contextual information. Since the contextual information includes our world knowledge and culturally-determined appropriateness, considering the cultural import in metaphor is justified. We have already touched upon the issue of culture very briefly in Section 4. However, the importance of culture in proper understanding of metaphor can never be overemphasized. Just as there are cross-culturally universal metaphors,⁵⁰⁾ so are there culture-specific metaphors. In a study of Kuna Indians,

50) Probably the orientational metaphors such as 'up-down' 'front-back' metaphors are cross-culturally universal or near-universal. In many cases, 'body' metaphors seem fairly universal as well. Since our ontological/physical orientation is straightforward, and our body provides a ready reference, such (near-) universality is not very surprising. One interesting exception I noticed is reported in Nida (1959), i.e., in Quechua future is behind us and the past is in front of us, Nida interpretes it as based on the fact that

Sherzer (1990:71-72) reports how pervasive the metaphor is in their language.⁵¹⁾ For example, their language has positional verbal suffixes (i.e., lying, perched, standing, and sitting) as a grammatical category. This is an instance of grammatical encoding of metaphorical concepts. Again, these suffixes are metaphorically used to express one's status in the community. Furthermore, the entire chanting text of "counseling" for a newly established chief given in the study is metaphorical.⁵²⁾ For example, the chief is metaphorically represented as a pole or a tree, ordinary people as butterflies, deer, birds, etc., and important people as white-lipped peccaries, tapir, squirrels, etc. Such metaphorical encoding is cultural and therefore, its decoding is inevitably through the view of the culture.

There is a theory that captures the importance of culture and its influence on language — the theory of stereotype. Even though it is plainly true that language is largely a cultural artifact, metaphor is probably the example *par excellence*. In the subsequent discussion, I will attempt to show how the stereotype theory can deal with many problems introduced in the preceding discussion.

In Putnam (1975), in a discussion of thorny problem whether semantics is possible⁵³⁾, he introduces the notion of stereotype as one having linguistic relevance. In a traditional view, the meaning of a term is given by specifying a conjunction of properties. However, there is a problem in the notion of property. Therefore, what would be a rudimentary step of the semantics — the definition of an entity (of natural kind such as 'lemon', in her example) — cannot be achieved. He shows that the core facts that one conveys in cases of natural kind words are the extension and the associated *stereotype* — the associated idea of the characteristics of a normal member of the kind (ibid. p.150). The stereotype associated with the lemon, for example, is 'yellow peel', 'tart taste', etc. According to this theory, *water* and *gold* have folk definitions, while their expert definitions became available only through modern science.⁵⁴⁾ Stereotypes are associated with the folk definitions, which are simply not true with regard to the expert definitions. For example, even though the folk definition of *gold* most probably refers to the yellow color, it is not its essential attribute, but rather that of the impurity in the gold.

Needless to say, such stereotypes are often formed with cultural influence, and therefore, there

we do not know the future, while we know the past.

51) A similar report is found in Howe (1977).

52) Even though the speaker (singer) does not rigorously try to make the chanting remain a consistent metaphor, and thus fluctuates between the literal and the metaphorical, the entire text is largely metaphorical.

53) See Chapter 8 'Is Semantics Possible?' in Putnam (1975).

54) According to Taylor (1989:73), words like *chair* and *cup* do not have expert definitions at all.

are as much cross-cultural difference as universality. For example, in most Asian cultures as in Korea or China 'dragon' is associated with very positive stereotypes, mainly because its mythological association with the heavens and kings, while in Western cultures it is associated with very negative stereotypes, presumably because of its biblical association with Satan. This example also shows that since the dragon is an imaginary creature, such stereotypes cannot be a product of physical experience, or anything other than pure cultural product. Some objects to which one culture associates stereotypes may not have any stereotypes associated with them in another culture. For example, Koreans and Chinese attribute longevity to turtles and cranes, while most other cultures do not.⁵⁵⁾ Some objects may have different stereotypes by different cultures. For example, the stereotypes of 'policeman' range from 'quick', 'good', 'efficient', to 'severe', 'corrupted', 'bad', etc. depending on the cultures.⁵⁶⁾

We remember that Searle had disapproval for the comparison thesis arguing that a metaphor and its similarity statement may have different truth-conditions (e.g., on the basis of ethological fact in case of the gorilla-example above). Considering this, the claim made by Searle amounts to saying that the truth conditions must be based only on the expert definitions, which lacks justification. Also, he argues that the fact that the object indicated by the vehicle does not have to exist is a weakness of the comparison theory. But, again, it does not hold good because the properties of the vehicle are culturally determined stereotypes, and therefore, they do not have to exist in reality. As a matter of fact, the users of stereotype often know that the stereotypes are not always true.⁵⁷⁾

As a matter of fact, the presence of the stereotypical properties is a crucial point in understanding metaphors. Previously we have seen that the properties inferrable from the vehicle are not randomly chosen; they must be meaningful. Let us consider the following example previously given.

(59) Man is a wolf.

man:	a. [is animate], b. [has four limbs], c. [is largely egoistic/greedy], d. [aggressive],
wolf:	a. [is animate], b. [has four limbs], c. [is largely egoistic/greedy], d. [aggressive],

55) The Kuna Indian's metaphor in 'counseling' discussed above has many such examples.

56) This last example is from Osgood et al (1975:198-199).

57) One interesting such example is the stereotype of stars. Stars are thought as if they are pointed; depending on cultures, they have three points up to seven points — that is the way they draw them. However, they know that they are not physically pointed. Krifka (p.c.) suggests that this is the case of visual illusion due to the sparkling. E.g. in European culture the planets which do not sparkle are not drawn as having points.

- (60) Pigs are not always pigs.
- a. Pigs (the animals we are familiar with) are not always dirty and offensive,
 - b. pig: any of various short-legged and typically stout-bodied mammals (family Suidae) with a thick bristly skin and a long mobile snout; especially a domesticated pig belonging to the same species (*Sus scrofa*) as the European wild boar.

In example (59) above, we saw that the properties chosen to make the metaphorical statement are likely to be (c) and (d). But, at a closer look, we see that the properties (c) and (d) are not denotative properties, but rather stereotypical ones. Probably (c) and (d) are (near-)universal properties of all wild animals after all. But, somehow, we happened to be in a culture which attributes them to wolves, as if they were defining characteristics of the wolves. It is not at all inconceivable that a culture in which people believe or have a myth that they are descendents of wolves may have very different stereotypes about wolves. Therefore, specifying the notion 'inference' I used in Section 5.4.1 as 'stereotypical inference' seems to be a considerable advance. Now, the given formula will be read as follows:

- (61) $\exists G [\text{be-a-wolf} \sqsubseteq G \wedge G(\text{man})]$
 <There exists a property G, which is stereotypically inferrable from be-a-wolf, and man has the property G.>

The same argument can be made about 'pigs' in example (60) above. But, this apparently self-contradictory statement has another significant point. Previously I claimed that there exists a certain asymmetry between tenor and vehicle, which was the motivation for taking the vehicle as a predicate (predicative property) rather than as an entity. (See Section 5.4.1.) That asymmetry becomes clear in this example; the tenor 'pig' has denotative meaning, while the vehicle 'pig' has stereotypical meaning. Therefore, by taking stereotypes into account, the tautology statements are no longer tautologies, and the contradictory statements are no longer contradictory: they are well-formed and meaningful statements.

Another piece of support comes from the following example. We presented a puzzle that some tautological statements fail to be metaphors.

- (62) a. ? Buildings are buildings.
 b. ? One plus one is one plus one.

Considering that the vehicles 'buildings' and 'one plus one' do not have stereotypical properties, what is being shown is clear.⁵⁸⁾ In short, in tautology statements 'A is A', if A lacks stereotypical properties, the statement fails to have a metaphorical interpretation; it becomes

merely false or an 'incomprehensible' statement.

Using Gricean maxims for the study of metaphor has already been attempted even by Grice himself. He described in two short paragraphs (ibid. p.53) how a hearer would be led to a metaphorical interpretation by the failure of the literal interpretation because of categorial falsity (violation of maxim of quality) as in *You are the cream in my coffee*. However, even though it is true that the recognition of metaphor is achieved by way of Gricean maxims, he fails to explain how the metaphoric interpretation actually comes about. In this respect, the invocation of the notion of stereotype will fill in the vacuum in his theory. Also, as we have seen, there are cases of metaphor where the recognition is based on maxims other than quality, such as relevance. These two points may be considered a contribution to the study of metaphor.

Now that we are properly equipped with the theories of Gricean maxims and stereotypes, there is one last point to be made. Searle critiques Miller's comparison thesis saying that how the variables (standing for certain properties) are computed is never explained in the theory. As I have pointed out, the logical formula is merely a shorthand of metaphorical statements, where nothing is reduced. Now, in this alternative approach, at least one strong constraint is provided: the computation of the relevant properties is based on whether they are stereotypical properties or not. How is such selection motivated? — by the diligence of the hearer who tries to find a meaningful version in its interpretation.

5.4.4 Pure Similarity Statement vs. Metaphor

Since the analysis given here supports the similitude thesis to a certain degree, a comparison of pure similarity statements and metaphor is in order. To what extent are they similar? To what extent are they different? For clarification, let us consider the following chart of examples.

-
- 58) Since our tendency to ascribe meaningfulness to an utterance is so strong, it is not totally absurd to expect that some imaginative interpreter might interpret them something like: 'however shabby-looking they may be, buildings are stronger than huts' or 'the arithmetic activity of adding one to one is as straightforward and simple as 1+1', etc. However, it is obvious that they are not ideal metaphors. The possibility of the above interpretations, and their far-fetchedness are equally well explained in the Gricean maxims and stereotypes.

(63)

	property ascription statement	similarity statement	metaphorical statement	characteristics ⁵⁹⁾
a	Encyclopedias are books.	Encyclopedias are books. Encyclopedias are like books.	N	No Cat. Mistake No Stereotype
b	My mother is Audrey Hepburn.	My mother is Audrey Hepburn. My mother is like Audrey Hepburn	My mother is Audrey Hepburn.	No Cat. Mistake Stereotype
c	N	This farming field is a chessboard. This faming field is like a chessboard.	N	Cat. Mistake No Stereotype
d	N	The math teacher is a gorilla. The math teacher is like a gorilla.	The math teacher is a gorilla.	Cat. Mistake Stereotype

In the above example, needless to say, similarity statements can be either 'A is B' construction or 'A is like B' construction, the latter often called a simile. Since we can compare anything with something else — whether it has a justifiable similarity or not —, and since 'be like' is an assertion that the speaker is making such an act of comparing — whether it makes sense on the part of the hearer or not — the similarity statement is not constrained by categorial compatibility or stereotypes.⁶⁰⁾ In cases of (a) and (b), where no categorial mistake is committed, they can be interpreted as property ascription statement. However, since 'books' do not have stereotypes (a) does not have a metaphorical meaning. Interestingly, (b) sentence can be interpreted as having any of those three meanings — property ascription statement if the speaker is indeed a child of the famous actress; similarity statement if the speaker's mother resembles the actress; or metaphorical statement if the speaker's mother is, say, pretty, petite, acts superbly, or any other features we have stereotypically formed through cinema viewing, etc.⁶¹⁾ As (b) can have either literal meaning or non-literal meaning, the interpreter's decision should be based on his

59) Categorial mistake here is a short-hand for violation of Gricean maxim of quality.

60) In this sense, 'like' is the shock-absorber that neutralizes the 'shock', which is present in metaphors. I think the absense and presence of this shock make the similarity statement uninterestingly light, and the metaphors heavily burdened.

61) I believe this is one typical way of stereotype formation in the modern society. My image, like that of majority others, about Audrey Hepburn is only through viewing her performance in fictitious setting, and therefore not based on 'real' knowledge about her.

knowledge — both the real world knowledge and the stereotypical knowledge — and the interpretations' appropriateness in a given situation.⁶² Therefore, Grice's maxims (e.g., quality, relevance, generally co-operation) and Putnam's stereotypes are jointly in operation in this case.

In cases (c) and (d), they cannot be interpreted as identity statement, because they make categorical mistakes. However, since in (c) the 'chessboard' does not have stereotypical features, it can not be interpreted metaphorically; while in (d) the metaphorical interpretation is available because of gorilla's stereotypical feature. The example (c) is an interesting case, because this can be evidence that categorical mistake does not always render metaphoricity. It is similar to that the violation of Grice's maxim does not always result in metaphoricity, nor does the presence of stereotypes in the vehicle. *This farming field is a chessboard* is a simple description of the physical property of the field probably having the boundaries in very nice geometric patterns as those of a chessboard. Some might argue that such patterns are a stereotypical properties of a chessboard, but, since it is one of the defining characteristics of a chessboard in reality, I am inclined to consider it a 'real' property of a chessboard, and therefore the statement is the comparison of the physical similarity in the two objects. This sentence resembles metaphor at least in two ways; it has a common syntactic form of metaphor and violates selectional restriction. Then, what is it? I think this is a case of hyperbole — literal hyperbole. Note that the two similarity statements in (a) - (d) are graded by their syntactic forms (i.e., 'A is B' and 'A is like B'). The first one is a stronger claim than the second one, and therefore, the first is a case of hyperbole of similarity. The literal hyperbole and the metaphor are often intertwined when the vehicle has well-known stereotype. Therefore, if one says *Mary is ice cold* to mean that she is irresponsive it is a case of classical metaphor, but, if one says *This orange juice is ice cold* to mean that the drink is very cold, it is a mere hyperbole. This is directly relevant to my claim that the metaphoric features are "stereotypically inferrable" ones. It can better draw a distinction between literal hyperbole and metaphor.

As is seen above, the presence of stereotypical features and the violation of Gricean maxim(s) are two important elements in metaphor. (N.B. The violation of Gricean maxim does not have to be that of quality as evidenced in (b), nor does it have to be a flagrant one but may be a subtle one that results in less optimal interpretation.) All this indicates that the proposed analysis is on the right track.

62) I think the distinction between the pure similarity statement and the metaphorical statement in this example (b) is very subtle, and our interpretation as a pure similarity statement is often unknowingly extended to the metaphorical interpretation. I believe that that is the force of our stereotypical knowledge that freely comes into interpreting. It is particularly so because 'Audrey Hepburn' is well-known enough to create stereotype.

VI. Conclusion and Further Studies

In this essay, we reviewed some of the current theories of metaphor addressing the central issues, such as definition, proper disciplinary domain, etc., and concluded that the previously proposed theories have their individual merits, and some shortcomings as well, and that, therefore, an integrated theory may prove to have more explanatory power. Also, we briefly discussed the importance of the understanding of culture for the development of a more competent theory of metaphor. Based on this, I have sketched an alternative analysis, similar to Miller's comparison theory in its form, similar to the classic substitution theory in underlying concept, and similar to the interaction theory in the heuristics of interpretation. I have shown that a proper analysis of metaphor must utilize textual and contextual information, and thus argued for the use of the Gricean maxims. This puts the study of metaphor in the domain of pragmatics rather than in any other of the subdisciplines of linguistic investigation. In utilizing the contextual information, we discussed the important role of culture in the study of metaphor. Particularly, we have seen that stereotypes play an essential role in metaphor, and that stereotypes are dependent upon the culture.

Even though I acknowledged the importance of culture in metaphor, this essay seriously lacks any systematic investigation of culture's role in metaphor. Some cross-cultural investigation will considerably enhance the strength of this exploration.

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